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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a fierce battle going on over the social and legal construction of
new surveillance technologies that are rapidly becoming part of our daily lives.
One such surveillance technology is full-body scanners, officially known as
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT).' Body scanners were deployed in
airports across the United States in 2007.2 By June 2013, the Transportation
* Senior lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University, ytirosh@post.tau.ac.il.
f Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University, birnhack@post.tau.ac.il.
We thank Anita Allen, Niva Elkin-Koren, Assaf Jacob, Tal Zarsky, participants in
the Ohio State Law Journal's Symposium on The Second Wave of Global Privacy
Protection, our friends at the Tel-Aviv Law Faculty Seminar, and the students of the Law &
IT Colloquium, for helpful comments, Tami Yakira and Doron Peer for research assistance,
and the Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research at the Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv
University, for financial support. The authors' contribution to this work is equal.
I We perceive the official name given to the technology as a discursive attempt to
diffuse the privacy-related harms of body scanners and neutralize them. Accordingly, we use
the popular reference to the technology as body scanners.
2 At the time of writing there are approximately 800 body scanners in use in nearly
200 American airports. See infra Part II. Scanners were placed in additional locations, such
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Security Administration (TSA) removed out of operation one type of scanner
(the backscatter), which produces an x-ray image of the passenger's body.3 The
remaining scanners produce a generic image of the body and of external objects
attached thereto. 4 The mass installation of body scanners means that our bodies
are increasingly subject to a technologized gaze. This Article searches for the
privacy implications of scanning technologies.5 We offer a novel approach that
intertwines theories of privacy with theories of the human body. We locate the
discussion at the intersection of emerging new technologies, national security,
the social meaning of the human body, and privacy. While our analysis focuses
as courthouses in Colorado and Illinois, and several correctional facilities. See AIT:
Frequently Asked Questions, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/ait-frequently-asked-questions (last
updated July 23, 2013). Outside the United States, scanners are used in some countries, such
as Canada, the UK, Germany, and France, but their use was rejected in others, such as Italy,
Finland, and the United Arab Emirates. See Olga Mironenko, Body Scanners Versus Privacy
and Data Protection, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 232, 233-35 (2011). For an official
privacy analysis of body scanners in the European Union, see Commission Communication
to the European Parliament and the Council on the Use ofSecurity Scanners at EU Airports,
1, 50-59, COM (2010) 311 final (June 15, 2010) [hereinafter EU Communication].
3 The TSA explained that the decision came after the supplier of the backscatter
machines did not meet a congressional deadline to install a technological fix that would
show only the generic image. See Bob Bums, Rapiscan Backscatter Contract Terminated-
Units To Be Removed, TSA BLOG (Jan. 18, 2013, 8:07 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/01/
rapiscan-backscatter-contract.html. The notice did not cite privacy or health concerns, but
media reports added such reasoning. See, e.g., Scott McCartney, TSA Pulls Plug on X-Ray
Body Scanners amid Privacy, Health Concerns, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:02
PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2013/01/22/tsa-pulls-plug-on-x-ray-body-scanners-
amid-privacy-health-concerns/. For a detailed account of the TSA's use of airport body
scanners see generally Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed.
Reg. 18,287 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=TSA-2013-0004-0001.
4 Bums, supra note 3.
5 Body scanners raise additional social and legal issues, such as their health and safety
implications. See discussion in the EU Communication, supra note 2, IT 60-75. For a critical
discussion of health concerns framed within a Fourth Amendment analysis, see generally
Rebekka Murphy, Note, Routine Body Scanning in Airports: A Fourth Amendment Analysis
Focused on Health Effects, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 915 (2012).
Another concern is religious sensitivities. For discussion, see, e.g., Colleen Deal,
Comment, Faith or Flight?: A Religious Dilemma, 76 J. AIR L. & CoM. 525, 544-45, 556
(2011) (analyzing the scanners' implications on the free exercise of religion, arguing that the
government should consider less intrusive alternatives); Rohen Peterson, Note, The
Emperor's New Scanner: Muslim Women at the Intersection of the First Amendment and
Full-Body Scanners, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 339, 349-58 (2011) (arguing that the
government has not sufficiently considered the scanners' implications on Muslim women,
which is framed as a privacy interest in adhering to modesty requirements). For a discussion
of objections by Sikhs in the UK, see Dil Neiyyar, Sikh Concerns Delay Hand Search Plans
at UK Airports, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hiluk/8776146.stm. We do not address these aspects here; neither will we discuss the
decision-making process or the issue of costs of deploying the scanners.
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on the specific case of airport body scanners, the principles are applicable to
other data-gathering technologies which raise privacy concerns.
There are two main technologies for body scanning: millimeter wave and
backscatter. 6 Their intended function is to detect external objects attached to the
body. The technologies have undergone some adjustments; for example,
millimeter wave scanners now use Automated Target Recognition (ATR)
software that produces a generic figure rather than the actual image of the
passenger's naked body. The backscatter scanners, which do not have the ATR
installed, were removed from operation in June 2013. Airport security
authorities use the scanners to examine images of passengers for detecting
explosives and weapons.
In a post-9/11 world, scanners are a technology at the service of national
security. However, scanners not only expose nonmetallic objects that can be
used as weapons, but also benign objects and bodily traits that passengers often
wish to keep to themselves. The machines with the ATR, namely millimeter
wave scanners that produce a generic image, mark amputations, prostheses,
implants, piercings, and medical devices that are attached to the body, while the
machines without the ATR, namely the backscatter scanners, show all of the
above, plus surgery scars and genitalia. However, the ramifications of using
body scanners are broader than these cases. The imaging technology examines
our bodies in an equivocal way: it enables us to remain dressed while
undressing us; the use of scanners redraws lines between a normal body and an
abnormal body. Once it is the government that views its citizens' bodies,7
privacy is immediately at stake.
Current judicial and scholarly discussions of body scanners tend to assume
that their use violates privacy, and then turn-too quickly, as we shall argue-
to a balancing exercise under a Fourth Amendment analysis. In the course of
this analysis, the harm to privacy is taken for granted but not articulated.
However, serious balancing is futile when we lack the understanding of what is
at stake on one side of the equation-that of privacy. The rush to balance is
evident in a 2011 opinion by the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court of
Appeals, which is currently the only case that has directly discussed body
scanners. The case involved an administrative and constitutional challenge
brought by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) against the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the TSA.8 The court balanced the
6 See discussion infra Part II.A.
7 The scanners are currently applied to citizens and foreigners alike; hence we will
leave aside the question of whether foreigners enjoy the same level of privacy protection as
citizens.
8 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir.
2011) [hereinafter EPIC v. DHS]; see also discussion infra Part II.D. There were some
preliminary Freedom of Information Act petitions in the case, which we do not discuss here.
For a critical comment, see generally David Gusella, Violating Privacy in Private: How
EPIC v. DHS Creates an Impossible Burden on Plaintiffs Trying To Demonstrate a Privacy
Act Violation, 53 B.C. L. REv. E. SuPP. 169 (2012).
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interest in national security with an assumed harm to privacy, easily concluding
that governmental measures outweigh the harm to privacy.9 Following the
decision, the TSA initiated a rulemaking process.10 The unarticulated, a priori
assumption of harm to privacy, we shall argue, renders a balancing exercise
unconvincing. It is important to understand the nature of privacy violation even
if the ultimate outcome of balancing between national security and privacy
would grant more weight to national security. Such understanding might also
enable more creative solutions to the privacy concerns at stake.
This Article wishes to pause where others rush. We argue that before
turning to balancing and other doctrinal mechanisms to evaluate the
There is no consensus among scholars and commentators as to the conclusion of the
legal analysis. For arguments that the use of scanners is constitutional, see, e.g., Douglas A.
Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth Amendment Rights in
Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 440 (2011) (emphasizing passengers' consent to
being scanned: "so long as travelers endure the process, the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated"); Joshua S. Levy, Towards a Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and
Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 502, 540 (2011) (arguing that "[u]nder current
law, the constitutionality of body scanners in airports under the Fourth Amendment is an
easy case," then arguing that this should not be the case, and suggesting a novel
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment); William M. Bradshaw, Note, Borderline: Why the
Federal Government May Use Backscatter Technology To Search Vehicles and Containers
at International Borders, but the Fourth Amendment May Block Its Use on Persons, 44
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357, 1358 (2011) (discussing the use of various scanning technologies
at international borders, concluding that so long as the searches are routine, they are
constitutional); Jennifer LeVine, Note, Over-exposed? TSA Scanners and the Fourth
Amendment Right to Privacy, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 175, 188 (2011) (concluding that "it is
most likely that the new technology does not violate the Fourth Amendment and will be
found constitutional").
For arguments that the use of scanners is unconstitutional, see, e.g., Tobias W. Mock,
The TSA's New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment Implications of "Body-Scan"
Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 213, 248-49
(2009) (concluding that the use of bodyscanners as a primary search is unconstitutional,
whereas their use as a secondary search is constitutional); Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting
"Special Needs" Theory via Airport Searches, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 207, 220-21 (2012)
(concluding that the TSA's current policy violates the Fourth Amendment, but nevertheless,
that such arguments are likely to fail in court); M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken Rules:
The Fourth Amendment Implications ofFull-Body Scanners in Preflight Screening, 17 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 33 (2010) (arguing that the TSA should use body scanners only upon an
individualized suspicion); Brittany R. Stancombe, Comment, Fed Up with Being Felt Up:
The Complicated Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners"
and "Pat-Downs," 42 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 210 (2012) (concluding that the use of scanners
as a primary screening is unconstitutional, but that the use of ATR renders them
constitutional); Andrew Welch, Note, Full-Body Scanners: Full Protection from Terrorist
Attacks or Full-On Violation of the Constitution?, 37 TRANsP. L.J. 167, 184-98 (2010)
(questioning the efficacy of the scanners and arguing that the government needs to apply less
intrusive solutions).
9 EPIC, 653 F.3d at 10.
10 See Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287
(Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
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constitutionality of the use of body scanners in airports, we ought to examine
the unstated preliminary assumption that privacy is violated. We should better
define the privacy interests that are at stake when we are instructed to raise our
arms and pose between two giant blue boxes (backscatter scanner) or step inside
a special booth (millimeter wave scanner), before entering an aircraft. This
analysis is still valid after the TSA's announcement that it would be pulling the
backscatter scanners out of airports, a decision that did not elaborate on the
privacy implications of the scanners, thus leaving future policymakers without
clear guidance. Accordingly, the discussion of the technology of body scanners
also serves as a case study for figuring out the socio-legal context of new
technological systems. In this sense, we follow the theoretical framework
offered by Helen Nissenbaum, of "contextual integrity."" Contextual integrity
seeks to identify the impact of a new sociotechnical system on existing,
entrenched norms (social and legal) relating to the transmission of personal
information within a specific context. However, we add an additional layer that
emphasizes that unpacking theories of privacy is essential for such a task,
alongside a contextual analysis.12
Part II locates the discussion within a law and technology research
paradigm, briefly introduces the technology at stake, and sketches the timeline
of the regulatory framework. We discuss the legal challenges brought against
the TSA's policy thus far, with a focus on EPIC v. DHS.13 We show how the
court assumed the privacy harm without articulating it, and argue that this is a
flawed constitutional methodology.
In Part III, we attempt to articulate the privacy harm. We argue that
passengers experience two dissonances when they are instructed to undergo
scanning. The first, which we call the dress/undress dissonance, results from
the conflicting messages that the State conveys as to bodily privacy: ordinarily,
the State expects us to conceal our bodies, at least to some extent. This is the
case, for example, with anti-nudity laws or with legal limitations on
unwarranted searches.14 Via such rules, the law constructs, reflects, and
reinforces social norms regarding bodily propriety. The airport context, by
contrast, seeks to suspend these conventions: it is the State itself that requires us
to expose our bodies to its gaze and subject ourselves to its visual inspection.
" See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (offering a comprehensive model to assess the
privacy implications of sociotechnological systems). For a political-contextual analysis of
body scanners, see Eric Kula, Full-Body Scanners, Live Information and Rights in the
Airport: A Theoretical Perspective on Information Circulation (presented at the 2011
American Political Science Annual Meeting, Sept. 1-4, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract- 1901878.
12 See Michael D. Birnhack, A Quest for a Theory of Privacy: Context and Control, 51
JURIMETRICS J. 447, 449 (2011) (reviewing NISSENBAUM, supra note 11).
13 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).14 See discussion infra Part III.A.
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The second dissonance that passengers experience when their bodies are
scanned is the normal/abnormal dissonance. In most contexts, the State
conveys a message that it does not take account of its citizens' bodies, in the
sense that it is blind to bodily diversity: physical shape and size, disability, race,
gender, or sexuality are decidedly unnoticed and unrecorded by the government,
due to egalitarian legal principles, as embedded in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and in specific pieces of legislation.' 5
Body scanners, by contrast, amplify physical differences. The scanning
technology is based on detecting bodily anomalies. When scanners detect breast
prostheses,16 implants,' 7 amputations, adults' diapers, urinal bags, intimate
piercings, or body folds resulting from obesity, the passenger is required to
undergo a further search, this time a physical one in the form of a thorough pat-
down.' 8 Thus, these passengers are marked as abnormal and deviant. Although
the technology is not meant to discriminate between bodies and people, its
technological design and its use produce differential treatment that requires a
nuanced analysis.
To this contextual analysis we add privacy theory. We conclude that body
scanning harms privacy because it requires people to surrender their control
over their own body. Unlike some accounts that focus on human gaze (the TSA
agents') at our naked body or on the risk that the visual image produced by
scanners will leak without the subject's consent, 19 we argue that it is the very
moment of a person's knowing that she is examined in a way that defies social
conventions on body exposure and body normality that harms her privacy.20
15 See discussion infra Part III.B.
16 See Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). Durso involved a
petition brought by a woman who had undergone a mastectomy following breast cancer
treatment. Id. The petition was denied for lack of jurisdiction. See infra note 83.
17See, e.g., Ventura v. Napolitano, 828 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1039 (D. Minn. 2011)
(involving a petition brought by Minnesota's former governor); Roberts v. Napolitano, 798
F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2011) (involving a petition brought by a pilot with an artificial hip).
Both petitions were denied for lack of jurisdiction. See infra note 83.
18 Pat-downs may also have the effect of marking bodies as abnormal-for example, on
the basis of race. The Chicago Sun-Times reported that extra scrutiny is being dedicated to
black women's hair. See Mary Mitchell, When the TSA Wants To Check Your Afro for
Security Reasons, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 20, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/mitchell/
15852017-452/when-the-tsa-wants-to-check-your-afro-for-security-reasons.html.
19See, e.g., LeVine, supra note 8, at 186-87 ("[T]he privacy violation occurs when the
scan captures the images of a passenger's body.").
20 Eric Kula made a similar argument in analyzing EPIC's petition (prior to the
decision). He pointed to the emphasis of both the TSA and EPIC on the final form of
representation. See Kula, supra note 11, at 13. Other commentators pointed to harms such as
humiliation in the examination itself and the subjective judgment of the TSA agents,
especially when compared to the objective inspection of magnetometers. See, e.g., Mock,
supra note 8, at 238-39. Yet another scholar observed that the actual intrusion of privacy is
not the retention of the image, but the actual production of the image. See Taylor, supra note
8, at 15.
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The external gaze is forced upon us and is internalized, so that for a few
seconds, we no longer have control over our person.
The State attempts to diffuse these dissonances by technological,
operational, discursive, and legal means. Technologically, the scanners blur
faces, and now use only a generic outline of a human body. Operationally, the
agent reviewing the image sits in a remote location and does not see the
passenger; the State allows opting out from being scanned, though the
alternative is to undergo a thorough-and often intrusive-pat-down.
Discursively, the language that is applied to describe scanning presents it as an
automatic, anonymized, universal, neutral, routine, and professional process.
Scanners were euphemistically renamed Automated Image Technology to
downplay the centrality of the visual inspection of the naked body.
Additionally, the debate on the legitimacy of scanning is framed as a binary
choice between national security and privacy. Legally, scanning is classified as
an administrative search or as an exception, and in any case, national security
easily trumps privacy. We conclude that the integrated measures indeed appease
some of the privacy harms and other concerns, but they do not resolve the two
dissonances we identify and discuss here, and thus do not undo the privacy
harms.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
By the time this Article sees daylight, many readers will have already
experienced their bodies being scanned as part of their air travel. In this case,
we have the unusual opportunity to observe the process of technological
deployment and the social and legal reception of the technology as it takes
place. This intermediate period, until the use of body scanners reaches wide
acceptance, if so, is a crucial one. We are now amidst a political and semiotic
battle that takes place both behind the scenes and on stage: congressional
hearings, legal processes, an administrative rulemaking process, media
discussions, and perhaps most important-passengers' personal experiences in
airports. The main process of the social construction of the technology (SCOT)
takes place within this timeframe. SCOT is an analytical framework that insists
on the social dimension of technology-its development, use, and reception. 21
Viewing body scanners within this analytical framework rejects a
deterministic approach of technology, according to which technology develops
within a mysterious autonomous sphere, to the point that it can be personified
and treated as if it were some independent entity.22 The analytical framework of
SCOT holds that technology is not value-neutral: to the contrary, it holds that
technology is loaded with values. Social values are an inseparable part of the
21 See, e.g., SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL
CHANGE 76-77 (Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992); THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF
TECHNOLOGY 3-16 (Donald Mackenzie & Judy Wajcman eds., 2d ed. 1999).22 See, e.g., KEVIN KELLY, WHAT TECHNOLOGY WANTS 269-74 (2010).
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technology: values are designed into the technology to begin with,23 or injected
into the technology by a process of an ongoing social engagement with the
technology. 24 The result is that technologies bear a normative meaning. The
particular meaning of a certain technology might change over time, although
once an initial closure is reached, in most cases, the battle is over. 25
Once we accept the premise that technological design is not only a technical
process but has an important and inevitable social dimension, the door is open
to insist on a technological design that takes into account the values that we
cherish. This is one case of what Joel Reidenberg called Lex Informatica,26 and
Lawrence Lessig famously called Code.27 Applied to privacy, this is the notion
of Privacy by Design (PbD). 28 PbD is the rather simple idea-though not
necessarily easy to apply-that privacy guarantees should be designed into the
technology to begin with, ex ante, rather than trying to fix a technology by
adding privacy patches, ex post, at which point it is more difficult and
expensive. PbD has now won global attention; 29 it is encouraged by the Federal
Trade Commission,30 and the European Union is considering it (or more
accurately, data protection by design, in European parlance) as a legal
requirement.31
23 For the value-based characteristic of technology, see HUMAN VALUES AND THE
DESIGN OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-6 (Batya Friedman ed., 1997); and in the context of
the privacy implications of technology, see NISSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 4-6.
24 Accordingly, we will pay attention also to the reception of the scanners and
passengers' experiences. See infra Part II.C.
25 Body scanners provide an interesting test for closure: passengers seem to have
accepted the scanners, but as acceptance grew and opposition diminished, the government
decided to pull out of airports the more invasive scanners. In other words, we were getting
close to a social closure, but then the cards were reshuffled anew.
26 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998).
2 7 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
28 The idea is usually attributed to Dr. Ann Cavoukian, Ontario's Information and
Privacy Commissioner. See About PbD, PRIVACY BY DESIGN, http://privacybydesign.cal
index.php/about-pbd/ (last visited June 23, 2013).
29 See "Privacy: Generations, " the 32nd International Conference of Data Protection
and Privacy Commissioners Closes with a New Executive Committee and New Members,
ILITA, http://www.justice.gov.il/PrivacyGenerations/News/newsl8.htm (last visited June
23, 2013); see also 32nd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners, Resolution on Privacy by Design, 2 (Oct. 27-29, 2010), http://www.just
ice.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/F8A79347-170C-4EEF-A0AD-155554558A5F/26502/Resolutionon
PrivacybyDesign.pdf (proposing to promote PbD initiatives globally).
3 0 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 22-34 (2012), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
31 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 23,
COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
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Furthermore, once we acknowledge that technological design has a social
dimension, the law, often ridiculed as desperately lagging behind technology, is
re-empowered to address the technology. The law, both legislation and
adjudication, reflects a nation's value judgment (at least this is the ideal of
democratic countries). Thus, the law can insist on subjecting the use of new
technologies to its scrutiny and it can impose limitations thereupon. As with all
regulation, such intervention should be based on a careful evaluation; it is not
always a wise avenue, and in some cases, it might fail. For example, online
regulation is notoriously difficult due to the global dimension of the network
and the ease with which malicious parties can relocate their activities.32
Accordingly, before instigating a new policy, we should carefully understand
the technology, its design, and its operation.
Applying this analytical framework with the additional layer of the law to
body scanners, we refuse to accept the technology as is, and search for the
values that are reflected and reinforced by it, and for the interaction of the
technology and the law. Importantly, the law's attitude to the technology is
itself another element that shapes the social meaning of technology; it can
approve or delegitimize it.
Accordingly, we begin with a brief introduction of the technology at stake
and its capabilities, along with some indications of how it was received, and
then turn to outline the legal authority to install the scanners in airports, and the
timeline of the deployment itself. We summarize the few legal challenges thus
far, and focus on the judicial balancing exercise, which, we argue, is partial,
structurally biased, and hence flawed.
A. The Technology and Its Design
This Section briefly introduces the technologies at stake and their
capabilities, and, applying the insights about the social meaning of technology,
points to the sociotechnological decisions that are made in the process of the
body scanners' design and use.
Two kinds of technologies have been deployed in airports and used as body
scanners: millimeter wave and x-ray backscatter. Millimeter wave systems
utilize nonionizing millimeter radio wavelengths in one of two forms. The first,
a passive system, forms an image from natural radiation emitted by the body,
with a rough body image and a clearer image of external objects. 33 An active
system illuminates the human body with radio waves (short wavelength), which
then bounce back to form a high resolution image of the body and external
32 See Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law
and the Internet, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 991-93 (1998). See generally Omer Tene, Privacy
Law's Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2013).
33 The TSA likens the image to a "fuzzy photo negative." See Brief for Respondents at
10, EPIC v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1 (2010) (No. 10-1157), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
body scanners/Body Scan DHS Opposition Brief.pdf.
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objects.34 The latter is used in American airports. The images produced are
three-dimensional. Passengers are directed to step in a special booth, where the
radio waves are emitted.
X-ray backscatter systems use a low level of x-ray beams that are projected
onto the human body and measure the backscattered radiation.35 The result is a
two-dimensional image,36 revealing details of the surface of the body and a high
resolution image of any external objects. 37 Passengers are directed to stand
between two large boxes and raise their arms above their head. The backscatter
scanners were in use until mid-2013. 38
Both technologies are designed to detect external objects that are attached
to the human body, close to the surface. The capability to detect nonmetal
objects is the main advantage of body scanners over the familiar walk-through
magnetometer metal detector gates. Importantly, the scanners see through
clothes: an object in a pocket or underneath one's shirt or trousers will be
spotted. The person is scanned without taking off his or her clothes. There is
some dispute as to whether the scanners can detect liquid or powder.39 The
image produced by the backscatters shows the naked body, its size and shape.
This image includes elements that are usually visible such as height or general
physique, but can also show less visible features, such as amputations, body
folds, or the kind, size, and shape of breasts and genitalia. For example, a
transsexual person who has not undergone a sex reassignment surgery who
appears to the human eye as a woman, will be seen by the scanners with male
genitals.
At this point of technological development, the scanners only identify
bodily anomalies and cannot interpret the nature of the external object, e.g.,
whether it is a gun, an electronic device, or an artificial hip, and a human review
3 4 See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR TSA
ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY 3 (2011) [hereinafter TSA PIA], available at http:/
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-tsa-ait.pdf; Advanced Imaging Technology
(AIT), TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait (last
updated July 23, 2013).
3 5 See TSA PIA, supra note 34, at 3; EU Communication, supra note 2, $ 35(3);
Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), supra note 34.
3 6 The TSA describes the image as one that "resemble[s] chalk etchings." See Brief for
Respondents, supra note 33, at 10.
3 7 See an example provided by the TSA: AIT: How It Works, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/
ait-how-it-works (last updated May 22, 2013).
3 8 See Bums, supra note 3.
39 This capability implicates the efficacy of the scanners to detect raw materials of
explosives, and is an important factor in a balancing or trade-off analysis. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the scanners do detect liquids and powder. See EPIC v. DHS,
653 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). EPIC disputed this finding. See Petition for Rehearing at 10,
EPIC, 653 F.3d at 1 (No. 10-1157), available at http://epic.org/privacy/body scanners/
Petition%20for/o2ORehearing.pdf.
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is required. 40 Common objects that cannot be removed and are identified
include prostheses, implants, medical devices such as a urinal bag, or piercings.
According to a Privacy Impact Analysis (PIA) conducted by the TSA, the
backscatter system can see also under the skin in some areas of the body.41
These capabilities mean that objects or materials hidden under body folds of fat
people 42 and in cavities are beyond the reach of the scanners, at least in their
current stage of development. 43
This general description indicates that there are several crucial
technological-and social-decisions to be made during the design and use of
the scanners. Such decisions reveal the malleability and indeterminacy of
technological design. Importantly, they also reveal the ways in which design
can be used to either amplify or diffuse passengers' sense of harm to their
privacy. One such decision is the quality of the image that the machine
produces. The quality of the presentation can be downgraded so as to minimize
the details presented on the screen, without compromising the actual detection
of external objects. For example, after public criticism, the TSA added a fix that
blurs faces.44
A second sociotechnological decision is the presentation of image that the
machine produces. One option, which was used in most of the scanners until
they were withdrawn in June 2013, was to show the TSA agent the image of the
passenger's body. A second option, applied in some scanners as of 2011,45 is to
use the ATR software, which produces an image of a generic person. If there is
an external object, the image will show, for example, a spot on the generic
leg.46 The choice of the technological design has an operational implication.
The TSA instructed that the agents reviewing the naked images should be in a
remote location, so that they did not have direct contact with the person whose
naked body they view on screen, but when the scanners have the ATR
40 Newer technologies have developed. See, e.g., the so-called sniffing technology:
Jenny Parker Smith, Comment, Threatsense Technology: Sniffing Technology and the Threat
to Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 615, 631-32 (2010) (discussing
technology meant to detect biological, chemical, and nuclear threats by sniffing the air
around passengers in the airport).
4 1 See TSA PIA, supra note 34, at 3 (explaining that the backscatter technology "may
in some cases reveal matter underneath and near the surface of the skin (for example, the
bones of the shin or forehead)").
42 We consciously use the adjective "fat" rather than terms such as "obese," because fat
is the term that has been accepted in the field of fat studies as nonmedical and non-
euphemistic. For elaboration see Yofi Tirosh, The Right To Be Fat, 12 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHics 264, 270 & n. 11 (2012).
43 See ttienne Lombard, Comment, Bombing Out: Using Full-Body Imaging To
Conduct Airport Searches in the United States and Europe Amidst Privacy Concerns, 19
TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 337, 358-59 (2010) (listing vulnerabilities of body scanners). This
is yet another relevant factor to assess the efficacy of the scanners to detect terrorists.
44 For the TSA's description of the blurring feature, see TSA PIA, supra note 34, at 6.
45 See id. at 2.46 See id. at 5 (illustrations).
2013] 1273
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
component, the reviewing agents are located near the machines and the
passengers.47 Additionally, the image or information produced by the scanners
is not accessible to passengers. It is reasonable to assume that many of the
passengers are unaware of the nature of the inspection that the scanners make
possible or of the high resolution of the images. The result is that passengers are
gradually accustomed to (yet another) technology whose use and operation they
do not fully know or understand.
A third sociotechnological design decision relates to the storage of the
image. The scanners can be designed so that the image is stored locally, stored
in a central database, or not stored at all. Indeed, in 2010, the U.S. Marshals
Service admitted it recorded images of 35,000 people who were scanned in a
Florida courthouse (with blurred faces), and explained that this was done for
training purposes. 48 The storage option has since been disabled from the
scanners currently in use. 49 Moreover, the TSA explained to Congress that the
machines are not networked,50 and the TSA agents who review the images are
not allowed to hold a camera or other recording devices.
The semiotic domain also plays a role in shaping the way scanning is
perceived and experienced. Body scanners were euphemistically renamed
Automated Imaging Technology, a term that downplays the centrality of the
visual inspection of the naked body. This language presents scanning as an
automated, anonymized, universal, neutral, routine, and professional process.
The social meaning of the technology does not take place in a void. The
public debate about the legitimacy of scanning has been framed as a binary
choice between national security and privacy.5' Such a binary formulation
downplays the possibility of protecting both privacy and national security
through different technological designs. This framing also leads to the
seemingly self-evident conclusion that national security should trump privacy in
this case.
Finally, the legal conceptualization of scanners also plays a role in diffusing
the passengers' potential sense of harm to privacy. Scanning is classified as an
administrative search because it is applied equally and routinely on all
passengers. As such, it is considered an exception to the Fourth Amendment
probable cause analysis. 52
The face blurring, use of generic figure, lack of passengers' access to their
images, storage options, and the semiotic, discursive, and doctrinal framing of
this technology are but a few of the more salient design decisions. Creative
designers and the institutions that procure and deploy the scanners make many
47 See id.48 See Declan McCullagh, Feds Admit Storing Checkpoint Body Scan Images, CNET
NEWS (Aug. 4, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20012583-281.html.
49 See TSA PIA, supra note 34, at 5.
50 See Reply Letter from TSA to Comm. of Homeland Sec. § 8 (Feb. 24, 2010),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/TSA Reply House.pdf.
51 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 40, at 617; Welch, supra note 8, at 183-85.52 See infra Part II.D.2 for an elaboration of the doctrinal analysis.
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more minute decisions that accumulate to shape the machine as it is used and
experienced. Thus, body scanners do not develop out of thin air. Rather, the
scanners are planned and produced by human beings to meet governmental
instructions. The commissioning party and the designers embed their values in
every bit of software and hardware, and no less important, the scanners are
experienced by human beings who have feelings, needs, and bodies.
B. Timeline and Legal Authority
Airport security has deserved much attention since the 1960s global wave
of airplane hijacking. 53 Airport authorities have undertaken various security
measures, often applying a multilayered approach.54 A central component of
such measures is the assurance that terrorists, explosives, or both will not enter
a sterile area before boarding. Here, our focus is on the passengers rather than
their luggage. A common security measure is to search the passengers, i.e.,
screening. Screening can be conducted in several ways5 5 : using the familiar
metal detectors (the walk-through gate or the handheld wands), or a manual
search, i.e., a physical inspection, with options ranging from a light frisk to a
pat-down of various degrees of intensity, and ultimately a full-body strip search.
Body scanners are the latest measure in this arsenal.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 set the
responsibility for civil aviation security with the TSA,56 explicitly authorizing
and requiring the screening of all passengers. 57 Accompanying federal
regulations require that the screening take place before entering a sterile area.58
In 2004, Congress empowered the TSA to develop detectors for nonmetal,
chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.59 The challenge was met. In
2007, the first body scanners were installed in several airports and applied as a
secondary screening method (the primary method being metal detection, using
magnetometers). The government then conducted a procurement process
followed by field tests (pilot projects) in 2008-2009.60 In 2008, the TSA
53 See Welch, supra note 8, at 170-75 (surveying the history of airplane hijacking and
governmental response).
54 See EU Communication, supra note 2, 1 84 ("Security can be achieved only through
a combination of approaches, supported by strong international cooperation and high quality
intelligence."); Layers of Security, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/layers-security (last
updated Jan. 26, 2013).
5 5 For a concise survey of several methods, see Mock, supra note 8, at 217-22.
56 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(1) (2012); 49 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2006); id. § 44901(a).
5 7 See 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1) (authorizing screening); id. §44901(a) (requiring
screening).
58 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107(a) (2012).
59 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458
§ 4013(a) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44925(a), (c)). The latter subsection authorized $250
million for research, development, and the installation of such systems.
60 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 33, at 4, 17.
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conducted a PIA, which was later updated. 61 The security need to detect
nonmetal explosives deserved a boost in late 2009, after Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab (commonly referred to as the Christmas Day bomber or the
"underwear bomber") attempted to activate explosives hidden in his underwear
on board a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.62 In late 2010, the TSA
implemented a new policy: body scanners moved to the front as a primary
scanning method and the alternative manual search escalated from a light frisk
to an enhanced pat-down. 63 In 2011, the TSA implemented the ATR technology
in the millimeter scanners, which produces a generic image instead of the actual
human figure. In January 2013, the TSA decided to cease the use of
backscatters by mid-2013, and at the same time, initiated a rulemaking process,
soliciting comments from the public. 64
The numbers have grown fast. In January 2011, there were 486 scanners in
78 airports throughout the United States.65 By October 2012, approximately 800
scanners were installed in about 200 airports.66 Interestingly, the quick
installation of the scanners was accompanied by a change of name. The
technology was initially referred to in a functional manner, as Whole Body
Imaging, but later replaced with the more technical term of Advanced Imaging
Technology, which, importantly, omits the reference to the body.
C. Experiencing the Scanners
The TSA's 2010 policy, moving body scanners to the forefront as the
primary search method and offering passengers the choice to opt out and be
subject to an enhanced pat-down, met some public objection and extensive
media coverage. There have been a few high profile acts of protest, including
several online groups, 67 a National Opt Out Day on Thanksgiving in 2010,68 a
61 See TSA PIA, supra note 34, at 2. The legal anchor for the PIA is 6 U.S.C. § 142(a)
(appointment of a Privacy Officer), and § 142(a)(4) (power to conduct a PIA).62 The reaction was global. See EU Communication, supra note 2, 15 (noting that
several states speeded up the development of technologies capable of detecting nonmetallic
and liquid explosives).
63 The policy is set in unpublished instructions, under the title TSA Screening
Checkpoint Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). See the district court's comments in
Redfern v. Napolitano, No. 10-12048-DJC, 2011 WL 1750445, at *4 (D. Mass. May 9,
2011).
64 See Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78 Fed. Reg. 18,287
(Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540).
65 Redfern, 2011 WL 1750445, at *1.66 See Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), supra note 34.67 See, e.g., FLY WITH DIGNiTY, http://flywithdignity.org/ (last visited June 23, 2013);
WE WON'T FLY, http://wewontfly.com/ (last visited June 23, 2013).
68 See Jeffrey Rosen, The TSA Is Invasive, Annoying-and Unconstitutional, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 2010, at B 1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/11/26/AR2010112604290.html.
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pilot's public account of his experience, 69 a passenger who wrote the text of the
Fourth Amendment on his chest and was subsequently arrested, 70 and in
Germany, a nude protest in an airport, organized by the Pirate Party.71
Still, it seems that overall, support for the usage of scanners was larger than
the criticism it drew. A Gallup poll conducted in January 2010, shortly after the
Christmas Day bomber was arrested, found 78% approval of body scanners. 72
Polls conducted in November 2010, shortly after the implementation of the
2010 policy, were somewhat inconsistent, with a general tendency of finding
public approval for the scanners. A Zogby International poll found that 61% of
Americans oppose full body scans and thorough pat-downs,73 but a Washington
Post-ABC News poll found that 64% support scanning and 50% think that
enhanced pat-downs are not justified;74 a CBS News poll found that 81% of
Americans support the use of scanners. 75 A Fox News poll found that 61%
prefer the scanners to pat-downs (with a slightly higher percentage for this
preference among women). 76 An NPR-Thomson Reuters poll found that 23%
of those surveyed said they would refuse to be scanned, 77 but in practice, it
seems that the rate of passengers who opt out is much lower. A New York Times
69 See Michael Roberts, Pilot to TSA: "No Groping Me and No Naked Photos,"
LEwROCKWELL.COM (Oct. 18, 2010), http://archive.lewrockwell.com/origll /roberts-ml.1.1.
html. Roberts then filed a petition with the district court, which was denied for lack of
jurisdiction. See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2011).
70 When directed to the body scanner at the Richmond International Airport, Aaron
Tobey took off his shirt, exposing the message written on his chest. He was arrested on
suspicion of disorderly conduct in a public place, a charge that was later dropped. He then
sued various airport and TSA officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; with the exception of the First Amendment
claim, all of the claims were dismissed due to the TSA's immunity. See Tobey v.
Napolitano, 808 F. Supp. 2d 830, 831 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff'd, 706 F.3d. 379, 380 (4th Cir.
2013).
71 See Kula, supra note 11, at 23-27.
72 See Jeffrey M. Jones, In US., Air Travelers Take Body Scans in Stride, GALLUP (Jan.
11, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125018/air-travelers-body-scans-stride.aspx.
73 Hugo Martin, Poll Finds 61% Oppose New Airport Security Measures, L.A. TIMES
BLOG (Nov. 23, 2010, 11:41 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money co/2010/1 1/new-
poll-says-61-oppose-new-airport-security-measures.html.
74 Jon Cohen & Ashley Halsey III, Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds ofAmericans Support Full-
Body Scanners at Airports, WASH. PoST, Nov. 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/22/AR2010112205514.html.
75 Stephanie Condon, Poll: 4 in 5 Support Full-Body Airport Scanners, CBS NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2010, 6:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/15/politics/main705790
2.shtml?tag-contentMain;contentBody.
76 Fox News Poll: Airport Body Scanners Preferred 3-1 over Pat-Downs, Fox NEWS
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/12/17/fox-news-poll-airport-body-
scanners-prefered-pat-downs/.
77 Scott Hensley, Americans Say Security Checks Are a Bigger Health Concern than
Flights, NPR (Dec. 23, 2011, 8:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/22/14413
4785/americans-say-security-checks-are-a-bigger-health-concern-than-flights.
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report quoted officials stating that only 1% of passengers opted out and asked to
be examined by a thorough pat-down rather than being subject to scanning.78
One might argue that the public's acceptance of body scanners means that
passengers' expectations are that they will be scanned; thus, under the common
judicial test for privacy, there is no reasonable expectation to have privacy in
the airport. However, the above data about the public's perception should be
treated with caution. First, it illustrates the circularity of the reasonable
expectations test: the fact that privacy is violated and is accepted as a matter of
practice does not necessarily mean that the harm evaporates. People might
accept it because they do not have a real choice, and the alternative pat-down is
considered worse by most passengers. Second, it is unclear what passengers
know and do not know about body scanning. Defacto acceptance based on lack
of knowledge about the kind and level of intrusion is meaningless.79 Third,
ignorance does not legitimize the harm: human rights are protected even when
their bearers are unaware of their rights. Just as it is illegitimate to violate the
dignity of an unconscious person, it is illegitimate to violate the right to privacy
even if we are unaware that a violation occurs.
D. The (Hidden) Judicial Conception of Privacy
1. Legal Challenges
Courts have reviewed various security-related policies and screening
procedures in the past, for example the identification requirement,80 x-raying
carry-on baggage,8' and the use of magnetometers. 82 In all cases, courts
approved the governmental measures. Several challenges to the TSA's 2010
body scanning policy were submitted to district courts, but were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, as the law assigns the courts of appeals with exclusive
jurisdiction for reviewing TSA orders.83 The Supreme Court has not ruled on
the matter directly. Thus far, the single most important challenge was a petition
78 Scott Shane, Administration To Seek Balance in Airport Screening, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
21, 2010, at Al6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/22/us/22tsa.html?_r-1.
79Although anecdotal, while presenting drafts of this paper, we found that most
passengers who were subjected to body scanner screening were unaware of the images that
the scanners produced. Thus, it is only when they learned about the nature of those images
that their sense of the dissonances we describe below arose.
8 0 See Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 2006).
81 See Sima Prods. Corp. v. McLucas, 612 F.2d 309, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1980) (petition
for review dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
82 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 955-56 (9th Cir. 2007).
83 See 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2006); Blitz v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 2012);
Corbett v. United States, 458 F. App'x 866 (11th Cir. 2012); Ventura v. Napolitano, 828 F.
Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2011); Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2011)
(the fact that petitioners are pilots rather than passengers does not affect jurisdiction); Durso
v. Napolitano, 795 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2011); Redfern v. Napolitano, No. 10-12048-
DJC, 2011 WL 1750445, at *3 (D. Mass. May 9, 2011).
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brought by EPIC in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. 84 EPIC argued first, that
the procedure of adopting the policy ran afoul of the Administrative Procedure
Act,8 5 second, that the policy violated several federal laws-the Homeland
Security Act, the Privacy Act, the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act-and finally, that it violated the Fourth
Amendment. 86
EPIC won only on the first, administrative procedure issue.87 The court
found that the TSA's policy to install body scanners as a primary screening
method was a new substantive rule, rather than just an interpretive rule or a
general statement policy, and hence the TSA should have issued a notice and
solicited comments prior to adopting the policy.88 Accordingly, the TSA was
instructed to conduct an orderly administrative procedure, which it has done in
2013. Despite the remand on the administrative point, the court refused to issue
an injunction against the use of body scanners. 89
In the course of its administrative law analysis, the court commented in
passing that "[d]espite the precautions taken by the TSA, it is clear that by
producing an image of the unclothed passenger, an AIT scanner intrudes upon
his or her personal privacy in a way a magnetometer does not." 90 On
examination of the substantive privacy issues, the court rejected EPIC's
arguments in their entirety. 91 Regarding the argument that capturing passengers'
images is unlawful under the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, the court found
that lawful law enforcement activities are exempted.92 A second privacy
argument was that the use of the body scanners violated the Privacy Act, but the
court found that the Act applies only to governmental "systems of records,"
namely databases, whereas the TSA does not store the images and does not
maintain such a database. 93 The court acknowledged the TSA's potential ability
to re-identify passengers' images, but since there was no evidence that the TSA
has done so, the argument failed.94 Moving on to a Fourth Amendment analysis,
EPIC argued that the use of body scanners as a primary screening method is
more invasive than necessary. Phrased in constitutional terms, the argument was
84 See Petition for Review, EPIC v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1157),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/litigation/EPIC-vDHSPetition.pdf.85 EPIC first filed petitions with the TSA on behalf of thirty organizations, urging the
TSA to undertake a rulemaking process to receive the public's input. See id. at Exhibit 1;
Brief for Petitioner at 22, 30, EPIC, 653 F.3d 1 (No. 10-1157), available at http://epic.org/
EPIC Body Scanner OB.pdf.
86 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 85, at 32-37.
87 See EPIC, 653 F.3d at 6.
88 See id. at 6-7 (rule not merely interpretive); id. at 7 (rule not a general statement of
policy).
89 1d at 8.
90 Id at 6.
9 11d at 8 n.11.92 Id. at 8.
93 EPIC, 653 F.3d at 8.
94Id
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about the lack of proportionality of the measures applied to solve the conflict
between the security needs and privacy.
2. Administrative Search and Balancing
A brief doctrinal comment is in place.95 The Supreme Court articulated the
reasonable expectations test, which indicates whether a privacy interest is
harmed. 96 The test has both a subjective, descriptive element-the expectation
the person actually had at the time of the event at stake, and more importantly, a
normative, purportedly objective element-whether the expectation is
reasonable. However, as Orin Kerr aptly commented, "[a]lthough four decades
have passed since Justice Harlan introduced the test in his concurrence in Katz
v. United States, the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable expectation of privacy'
remains remarkably opaque." 97 The Fourth Amendment, which does not
explicitly mention privacy, requires that a search can be conducted only if it is
reasonable and is based on probable cause.98 Given that there is no dispute that
the screening is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,99 the
analysis should turn to the two requirements set in the clause: that the search is
reasonable, that it is based on probable cause, or both. These two conditions
should be met, otherwise the search is unconstitutional.100
The Supreme Court carved out some exceptions regarding the probable
cause prong of the Fourth Amendment, the administrative search doctrine being
the one most relevant here. 101 When a governmental search is routine, part of a
general regulatory scheme, and applies equally to all passengers regardless of
95 For a thorough discussion, see Reinert, supra note 8, at 220-21.
96 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).97 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REv. 503,
504-05 (2007).
98 The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
99 For discussion of this point, see Smith, supra note 40, at 627 (concluding that
searching a person's exterior is a search under the Fourth Amendment).
l00 f there is probable cause, then the search is deemed reasonable. See, e.g., Bailey v.
United States, 586 U.S. 1, 4 (2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213
(1979)) ("Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable' only if based on probable cause.").
101 Commentators have pointed to additional exceptions that might apply. We shall not
delve into them here, as they all converge into a balancing exercise. See, e.g., Bradshaw,
supra note 8, at 1357-58 (discussing the "border search" doctrine, which allows routine,
warrantless, suspicionless searches, without a showing of probable cause); LeVine, supra
note 8, at 179 (discussing the exceptional circumstances and special needs exception to the
probable cause requirement); Welch, supra note 8, at 182-83 (discussing the "critical zone"
doctrine).
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any specific suspicion, it is considered an administrative search, in which case
there is no need to show probable cause. 102 A typical example is a police
roadblock to verify drivers' licenses.103 An administrative search is nevertheless
still subject to the first condition set in the Fourth Amendment, namely the
reasonableness requirement. Courts have consistently interpreted the
reasonableness requirement to be a matter of balancing. For example, in a 1985
airport search case, the Supreme Court stated that
what is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the
search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself The
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 104
There are different judicial formulations of balancing. For example, in
2006, the Third Circuit applied other Fourth Amendment precedents to the
context of airport searches in United States v. Hartwell.105 Then-Judge Samuel
Alito wrote: "Suspicionless checkpoint searches are permissible under the
Fourth Amendment when a court finds a favorable balance between 'the gravity
of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty."'l 06
Here, we need not delve into the various balancing formulations, as a
common feature of all is the initial juxtaposition of the two prima facie
conflicting rights and interests. In the case of airport screening, the two rivals
are the governmental interest in protecting the public at large and the privacy
harm to the searched individual.' 0 7 The critique that follows is directed against
the common judicial application of the balancing formulas, rather than their
structure.108 In a nutshell, we observe that courts tend to assume that privacy is
harmed, without explaining how and why, with the result that the courts almost
102 For a judicial discussion of what is routine in this context, see Tabbaa v. Chertoff,
509 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
103 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (suggesting that such a roadblock
would be permissible). However, a checkpoint that was primarily designed to detect
evidence of criminal wrongdoing was not approved. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
104 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
105 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006).
106Id. at 178-79 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 420 (2004)).
'07Note the asymmetry of the juxtaposition, with the public on one side and an
individual on the other. For a discussion of the distributive assumptions of such balancing,
see generally Daphne Barak-Erez, Distributive Justice in National Security Law, 3 HARV.
NAT'L SECURITY J. 283 (2012).
108 Reinert, supra note 8, at 223-24 (criticizing the balancing test in this context for its
analytical and rhetorical bias).
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immediately turn to examine the potentially diffusing measures, namely, a
means-end fit examination. This is the case with the judicial treatment of body
scanners.
The EPIC v. DHS court classified the use of body scanners as an
administrative search that does not require an individualized suspicion.109 The
court cited a 2001 Supreme Court case, stating that the reasonableness of
administrative searches "is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other hand, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.""10 In other words, the court assessed reasonability as a matter of
balancing. The court then dismissed EPIC's argument: "In view of the Supreme
Court's repeated refusal to declare that only the least intrusive search
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and considering the
measures taken by the TSA to safeguard personal privacy, we hold AIT
screening does not violate the Fourth Amendment."I
Under the administrative search doctrine, the court then engaged in a brief,
and as we argue, a partial, balancing exercise: it first mentioned on the one hand
the obvious security need to detect explosives of all kinds (nonmetal included),
which it described as "acute."112 One would expect that the court would then
explain the privacy interest at stake and the harm thereto, but this side of the
scales was taken for granted. Recall the court's earlier comment that "it is clear
that by producing an image of the unclothed passenger, an AIT scanner intrudes
upon his or her personal privacy in a way a magnetometer does not." 1 3 The
court did not elaborate. Instead, on the other side of the scale it listed the
measures undertaken by the government to protect passengers' privacy: the
distortion of the image,114 the deletion of the image as soon as the passenger is
cleared, and finally, the alternative offered to passengers-opting out of the
scanning in favor of a (thorough) pat-down. 115
The court thus followed the accepted reasonableness-balancing test. This
formulation, which abstains from defining the harm to privacy, assumes too
much and is systematically flawed in that it reduces privacy to an almost always
overridable right.
109 EPIC v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Hold. (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 113 (2001)).
Ill Id. (citation omitted).112 Id.
113 Id. at 6.
114 This comment likely refers to face blurring rather than the use of ATR software that
uses a generic figure, as the latter was operated only in 2011.
115Id. at 10.
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3. Deciphering the Court's Privacy Conception
What does this judicial framing of the balancing at stake reveal about the
EPIC v. DHS court's understanding of privacy? 1 6 In the absence of explicit
statements, any discussion is up for debate. Our attempt is to discern the court's
implicit conception of privacy, portraying it in the best light possible. The key
to deciphering the court's privacy conception is in the conflict-diffusing
measures, namely the governmental measures to protect passengers' privacy.
First, the distortion of the image: if this measure is viewed by the court as
diffusing privacy harms, it indicates that the court considers the ability to link a
face, and by extension, one's identity, with an image of a naked body to be
harmful. Put differently, linkability is the key to deanonymize identity.
However, on the operational side, blurring the face, and we can add the TSA's
policy that the agent inspecting the images is located in a remote location, does
not guarantee the anonymity of the passengers. First, agents, like any other
human beings, gossip. Will all agents be able to withstand the temptation to
communicate to each other about a famous celebrity, for example Angelina
Jolie, when she is scanned?" 7 Second, the anonymity is partial to begin with, or
as privacy scholars call it in other contexts, it is traceable." 8 Passengers identify
themselves with a boarding pass and a passport as they enter the security area of
the airport. They are not again identified at the scanner, but their anonymity is
momentary and can be easily reversed. Thus, it seems that it is not the risk of
identification per se that bothers the court, but something else. Perhaps it is the
association of the naked body with identifying information, such as one's face.
Perhaps there is an assumption here that an image of a naked body that is not
associated with a face is a less intrusive situation, both in the eyes of the agent
viewing the images, and more importantly, in the eyes of the passengers, who
know that the gaze at their bodies does not include their faces. To the extent that
these are the court's assumptions and views of privacy, and to anticipate the
discussion, we argue that privacy is not limited to the interaction between a
human eye and our faceless, naked body. Rather, it is a matter of lack of control
over one's self.
Second, the court pointed to the deletion of the images once the passenger is
cleared. This indicates that the court considers the very existence of a database
to raise privacy concerns. Indeed, many privacy laws are constructed around the
idea of a database, perhaps even obsessed with the privacy risks associated with
ll 6 EPIC, 653 F.3d at 10.
l7 A congressional research report cited complaints by several women, who were told
to go through the scanners multiple times, apparently due to their looks. See BART ELIAS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42750, AIRPORT BODY SCANNERS: THE ROLE OF ADVANCED
IMAGING TECHNOLOGY IN AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING (2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42750.pdf.
118 See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 4, IT
11, 14-18.
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databases.1 19 Indeed, databases do pose potential risks, since if data is stored it
is likely to serve additional functions, other than the original security one. This
is a well-known phenomenon, known as function creep.120 One way to deal
with the problem is to impose legal constraints on the secondary use of data,
namely prohibiting the use of data for a purpose other than that for which it was
originally collected. This is the way the European data protection regime
chose,121 and in specific cases, also American law.122 Another way to address
the privacy risks associated with databases is to refrain from creating a database
in the first place. The court's emphasis on the latter option is surely important,
but it draws our attention to the fate of the data once collected, and away from
the moment of collection: when the passenger is technologically stripped of his
or her clothes, in front of the machine.
As other scholars have noted, the TSA's measures-and now also with
judicial approval-assume that the main privacy harm is the production of the
image of the naked body. However, as Madison Taylor aptly observed, "the
photographs, like the full-body scan images, are fruits of the violation, not the
actual violation."' 23 We shall return to the privacy harm in the next Part,
attempting to articulate it more clearly. Accordingly, withdrawing from airports
the backscatter scanners that produce the full naked images eases some of the
privacy concerns, but the initial violation itself persists.
Third, the court placed much weight on the availability of the physical pat-
down alternative. The court portrays this option as a choice that passengers
have. This judicial emphasis indicates that the court holds a liberal view of
privacy, which bases its arguments on consent. However, consent is a shaky
basis in situations of unequal power and when the choice means giving up the
exercise of the right to travel freely. The different conceptions of privacy in
Europe and in the United States are evident here. James Whitman helpfully
characterized the former's conception of privacy as based on dignity and the
latter as based on liberty.124 Accordingly, the Europeans are skeptical of
consent in certain situations, such as in the employment context, health services,
and similar situations where the data subject, to use European terms, hardly has
a real choice. An extreme version of the American view would not second-
'19 See, e.g., Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15
YALE J.L. & TECH. 24, 87 (2012) (arguing that the EU Data Protection Directive is
constructed around a deep concern with databases).
12 0 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The New Politics of Surveillance
and Visibility, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 3, 18-19 (Kevin D.
Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2006).
121 See Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC) ("Member
States shall provide that personal data must be: ... collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes.").
122See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(e)(1) (2012)).
123 Taylor, supra note 8, at 15.
124 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
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guess the individual's behavior. However, for those who do not have much of a
choice other than to travel by air, the choice between the scanner and the
thorough pat-down is a Hobson's choice.125 Some courts have acknowledged
this problem, stating that the legality of airport screening does not depend on
consent, and accordingly, have applied a balancing and proportionality test. 126
To sum up, this thought experiment, which reverse engineers the judicial
formulation of the balancing test in EPIC, can teach us that the court places
much weight on the human inspection of the naked body, perceives anonymity
as a central pillar of privacy, is concerned with databases, and holds a liberal
view that believes that choice, even if it is between bad and worse, diffuses any
harm. This, we argue, is a partial and narrow view of privacy. While all these
concerns are valid, privacy is more than the court's (assumed) perception
thereof.
4. Balancing with a Missing Variable
Let us return to the judicial framing of the constitutional setting: the court
placed national security on one side of the scales and described it as acute, and
placed an unarticulated privacy right on the other side of the scales. The court
did not elaborate on the latter, but it did conclude that certain measures diffuse
any harm to privacy.
Thus, the judicial balancing exercise was performed with a strong interest
on one side of the scales and an assumed but undefined harm on the other side.
The alleged conflict between national security and privacy was diffused by
turning to technological measures (face blurring, deletion of images) and
administrative measures (offering pat-downs as an alternative). Playing on the
geometrical metaphor of balancing, we can say that the court's setting of the
constitutional conflict and its resolution is akin to placing a variable of infinite
magnitude on one side of an equation, an unknown variable on the other side,
and concluding that the former is greater than the latter, due to several
additional factors.
It might be the case that the ultimate result and conclusion are correct.
Namely, that the security interest outweighs privacy interests, and that the
governmental measures do ease some of the privacy harms. However, a
constitutional balance of such importance and magnitude should not assume
125 Commentators have pointed to the shaky basis of implied consent in the context of
body scanning in airports. See, e.g., Lombard, supra note 43, at 354-55 (arguing that "the
common air travelers' 'willing' or voluntary submission to undergo a search fails to denote
more than forced acceptance"); Mock, supra note 8, at 236 (there is no consent where an
individual must elect between a governmental search and travel); Reinert, supra note 8, at
221-22 (concluding that consent is a weak and far-reaching ground to find airport searches
constitutional).
126 See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[R]equiring that a
potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search
makes little sense in a post-9/11 world.").
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that the privacy side of the scale is harmed without defining it. We need to
better figure out the privacy harm, so that we can better evaluate whether the
diffusing measures actually answer privacy concerns. Otherwise, the balancing
exercise is too vague and abstract to perform its role as a proxy for
reasonableness, as required by the Fourth Amendment.127 This is the next step
in our discussion, in which we first point to two dissonances caused by the use
of body scanners, and then to a contextual-theoretical analysis.
III. Two DISSONANCES
Body scanners reveal what is under our clothes. Some scanners
(backscatters) produce an image of body contours and folds, genitalia, breasts,
scars, prostheses, diapers and pads, and more. This image is very much akin to a
black and white photograph of our naked body. Other scanners (millimeter
wave) do not produce such an explicit image of the body's contours and
surface, but alert whenever any bodily "anomaly" is revealed (e.g., adult
diapers, implants, urinary bags, or prostheses), resulting in directing the
passenger to undergo a thorough pat-down.128 This fact renders the moment of
being scanned as extraordinary and puzzling vis-6-vis our ordinary relationship
with the State. This is an unusual moment because the law usually expects us to
cover our bodies and avoid appearing naked in public; thereby it participates in
ingraining in us dressing norms (the dress/undress dissonance). Moreover, the
State routinely signals to its citizens that it is uninterested in specific bodily
traits, as we are all equal before the law, whether we are fat or thin, disabled or
able-bodied (the normal/abnormal dissonance). What makes scanners a difficult
technology to grasp, then, is that it sees through our clothes and visually
undresses us while we remain physically dressed.
If these dissonances are indeed part of the scanning experience, then we
should conclude that passengers' privacy is harmed by airport scanning,
because their reasonable expectation is that the State refrains from requiring
them to subject themselves to a gaze that (technologically) strips off their
clothes, and sustains the passengers' expectation that they remain dressed.129
Passengers also reasonably expect that the Government sustains its disinterest in
bodily traits. Privacy serves as a safety valve for such expectations.
Note that we do not argue that airport body scanning is unconstitutional:
this conclusion can only be reached after careful balancing of the privacy harm
with competing rights and considerations. Our purpose is to take a step back
127 For additional criticism of the balancing in this context, see Taylor, supra note 8, at
26-27 (arguing that the balance is a priori inequitable and that judges place a thumb on the
scale in favor of the government); Barak-Erez, supra note 107, at 304 (arguing that
distributive considerations have been overlooked in the context of national security, namely
choosing between harsh security measures that affect a selective basis or less harmful
measures that affect a larger population).
128 See discussion supra Part II.
129 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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and understand how and why exactly privacy is compromised by the technology
of scanning. Such a detailed focus on the nature of the harm to privacy will
facilitate a more convincing balancing. The airport is akin to an assembly line,
in which passengers are the items that move from one point to another, and in
which they, along with their luggage, are subject to continuous inspecting
gazes. Scanners are the latest current innovation in this field of
transportation.130 Our discussion zooms in on this one element of the airport
process. Part of the analysis that scanners produce is applicable to other parts of
the airport security monitoring, and another part is unique to scanners.
We discuss the two dissonances, and then conceptualize them within a
theoretical understanding of privacy as a concrete manifestation of human
dignity, encapsulated in the notion of privacy as control.
A. The Dress/Undress Dissonance
Nakedness in contemporary culture is a solo affair, or else it is sexual by virtue
of the presence of a gazing second party. 13 1
As a result of eating the forbidden fruit, so the biblical story goes, Adam
and Eve felt compelled to cover their intimate parts, or more accurately, parts
that became intimate once they defied God's command. Genesis's narrative
links this transformation in human experience of the body-the sense of shame
that prompted the first two humans to cover themselves-to the ability for
ethical judgment. Adam and Eve were transformed into beings who distinguish
good from evil. This ability for moral evaluation was intertwined with their new
impulse to hide their nakedness. Moreover, despite God's rage on the first
humans that ate the fruit, God made leather garments for them to wear before
expelling them from the Garden of Eden.132 Thus, the divine stance seems to be
that having moral sensibilities comes along with creating boundaries between
one's naked body and the gaze of others.
As this ancient story conveys, the convention that it is imperative to cover
certain body parts is intrinsic to the human condition (although the question
which parts should be covered varies across time and culture).133 Contemporary
social arrangements reflect this social fact. As members of society, we receive
130 For a sociological account of the airport, see generally Kula, supra note 11.
131 Rob Cover, The Naked Subject: Nudity, Context and Sexualization in Contemporary
Culture, 9 BODY & Soc'Y, Sept. 2003, at 53, 56.
132 Genesis 3:21 (King James).
133 See generally Karen Tranberg Hansen, The World in Dress: Anthropological
Perspectives on Clothing, Fashion, and Culture, 33 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOLOGY 369 (2004)
(reviewing the cultural significance and habits of dress in different parts of the world, and
the theoretical paradigms that anthropologists use to understand them).
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constant messages that we must cover our bodies, that covering is pivotal and
that the ways in which we cover ourselves matter. 134
Violating dressing and undressing conventions does not pass muster in
contemporary society. When Janet Jackson's breast was exposed after Justin
Timberlake ripped off her bustier during the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show,
more than half a million viewers wrote to complain about the incident. 135
Indeed, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a $550,000
fine on CBS, which was then found to be unjustified by the Third Circuit (the
Supreme Court denied certiorari),136 but the significance of maintaining the
dress/undress convention still played an important role in the judicial treatment
of this case. Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the denial of certiorari,
doubted the network's argument that since the FCC has been tolerant to fleeting
expletives before, it should also be tolerant to fleeting images. Images are much
stronger than words, Roberts explained.137 Recall that it was an image of a body
part that according to convention must be covered. Millions of impressionable
children saw it, Roberts commented.138
Facebook has been censoring some photos of breastfeeding mothers,
sometimes even shutting off their accounts, explaining that such photos violate
13 4 See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 47 (2011)
(discussing the dual function of covering the body, as both concealment and exhibition and
urging to politicize the question of coercive dressing and undressing).
13 5 See Janet Jackson: Supreme Court Approves Super Bowl Ruling, BBC NEWS (June
29, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-18651908. For an
academic discussion of the event, see generally Lawrence Wenner, Recovering (from) Janet
Jackson's Breast: Ethics and the Nexus of Media, Sports, and Management, 18 J. SPORT
MGMT. 315 (2004). As Iris Young explains, the boundaries of how much of the breasts can
be exposed are political and value laden. See Iris Marion Young, Breasted Experience: The
Look and the Feeling, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BODIES: SEXUALITY,
APPEARANCE, AND BEHAVIOR 152, 156 (Rose Weitz ed., 2d ed. 2003) ("Cleavage is good-
the more, the better-and we can wear bikinis that barely cover the breasts, but the nipples
must be carefully obscured. Even go-go dancers wear pasties. Nipples are no-nos, for they
show the breasts to be active and independent zones of sensitivity and eroticism.").
136 See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 535 F.3d
167 (2009); CBS Corp. v. FCC, 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2677
(2012).
13 7 FCC v. CBS Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2677, 2678 (2012). Roberts concurred in the denial of
certiorari because the question became moot after the FCC clarified its policy.
138 Apparently, sometimes it is the mere mentioning of certain body parts that raises
shock and leads to severe sanctions. When Democrat Michigan House Representative Lisa
Brown mentioned the word vagina in a discussion on abortion law reform ("Finally, Mr.
Speaker, I'm flattered that you're all so interested in my vagina, but 'no' means 'no.'),
Republican representatives barred her from speaking on the floor, explaining that her remark
was "offensive," "over the line," and failed to maintain decorum. One representative said
that the word was so offensive that he didn't want to say it in front of women. See Christine
Roberts, Michigan State Rep. Lisa Brown Silenced After "Vagina" Comments, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 15, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-06-15/news/32258989_1-anti-
abortion-law-therapeutic-abortions-byrum.
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the social network's obscenity policy.1 39 In February 2012 about sixty mothers
protested this policy in a "nurse-in" outside Facebook's headquarters.1 40 In
September 2012, Facebook shut down the New Yorker's page due to an Adam
and Eve cartoon that allegedly violated the site's nudity policy because it
showed Eve's nipples (the affair received the name "nipplegate").141
The law partakes in protecting the norms of appropriate body coverage not
only through industry regulation, as we saw in the Janet Jackson case, but also
by penal means. Exposing body parts that must be covered according to social
convention is a criminal offense. In reading penal codes regarding forbidden
bodily exposure, we observe the vague and overbroad language applied. In a
manner atypical to criminal codices, which usually aspire for accuracy and
specificity, in criminalizing body exposure, penal codes apply a language that
relies on social conventions. The California Penal Code, for example, forbids
any person from "expos[ing] his person, or the private parts thereof" willfully
and lewdly.142 A reader of the penal code who is unfamiliar with local
conventions regarding where the line is drawn between acceptable showing of
the body (e.g., palms or the neck) and one that is considered an exposure of
something so deeply intimate that it amounts to one's "person," or is offensively
indecent, might be unable to decipher the law or abide by it.143
The legislative reliance on conventions to communicate what is permitted
and what is prohibited regarding bodily exposure conveys that the legislators
imagine a legal subject that "just knows" which bodily exposure crosses the
line. It is a line that is indeed hard to express accurately in a legal rule, but
nevertheless, it is clear enough to every social actor. The State, then,
participates in ingraining in us the notion that we should know better than to
expose ourselves.
The incidents in which anti-exposure laws are enforced, as well as their
very existence on the law books, have expressive importance.144 Through laws
139 See Asher Moses, Facebook Ban Incurs "Lactivist" Wrath, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Sept. 7, 2007, http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/facebook-mothers-outraged-at-
breastfeeding-ban/2007/09/07/1188783470779.html.
140 See Facebook Nurse-In: 60 Breastfeeding Moms Protest at Facebook Headquarters,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 15, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/08/
facebook-nurse-in-60-brea n1 263532.html.
141 See Robert Mankoff, Nipplegate: Why the New Yorker Cartoon Department Is
About To Be Banned from Facebook, NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.new
yorker.com/online/blogs/cartoonists/2012/09/nipplegate-why-the-new-yorker-cartoon-depart
ment-is-about-to-be-banned-from-facebook.html.142 CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 2013).
143 Furthermore, such forbidden exposure is grouped with sexual offenses such as rape
for the purpose of relaxing evidence rules regarding the defendant's other sexual offenses.
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1 108(d)(1)(A) (West 2013).
144 On the expressive role of law see generally Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner,
An Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 77 (2007);
Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the
ADA, 90 VA. L. REv. 1151 (2004).
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and sporadic enforcement, the law participates in maintaining the boundaries
between nudity and dress. And these laws are being enforced. 145 As a recent
Maryland incident indicates, "exposing" a fake penis has led to indecent
exposure charges against one Jacob Lee Bovia.146 Exposing one's intimate parts
can also be considered illegal discrimination against those present: myriad cases
on sexual harassment deal with acts of indecent exposure.147
The spaces in which people can walk around naked in our society are well-
defined and their boundaries strictly delineated: the nudist beach, the gym
showers, or one's own home.148 Even in fitting rooms in stores we are allotted
our own private space to be naked. When we expose our bodies for a cosmetic
treatment or a medical examination, an unspoken convention renders the
cosmetician or physician's gaze functional or clinical, neutralizing any potential
sexual meanings.149 In the case of medical examinations, the prevailing ethical
145 See, e.g., Andy Campbell, Thomas Edwin March Naked at Beach, Holding Laptop,
3D Glasses, Beer, Cheeseburger: Police, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2012, 1:32 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10/thomas-edwin-march-naked-at-beach n 18711
44.html; Man Arrestedfor Riding Bike Naked in Ohio Park, AKRON BEACON J. ONLINE (Oct.
9, 2012), http://www.ohio.com/news/break-news/man-arrested-for-riding-bike-naked-in-
ohio-park-1.340468; David Moye, Chainsaw Naked: Lindsay Medd Stevens Arrested for
Operating Power Tool with No Clothing, HUFFINGTON POsT (July 17, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/17/lindsay-medd-stevens-chainsaw-naked n 1680
878.html; David Moye, Marty Parrish Accused of Walking Naked on Florida Beach
Boardwalk, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
09/26/marty-parrish-walking-naked_n 1916733.html; Rachel Quigley, Police Arrest
Woman, 35, Who Stripped Naked at Busy Intersection, MAILONLINE (June 7, 2012),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2155865/Tracy-Mabb-35-took-clothes-exposed-gen
itals-Pompano-Beach-intersection.html.
I46 Man Gets Real Indecent Exposure Charge for Exposing Fake Genitalia,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
03/07/jacob-lee-bovia-arrested-exposing-fake-penis-maryland_n_1326558.html.
147 See, e.g., Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (plaintiffs boss
exposed himself to her, among other things); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d
118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (employees exposed their private parts to
plaintiff).
148 Even toddlers sometimes create discomfort in contemporary American society if they
run around naked, and caretakers are expected to make sure that at least their genitals are
covered. See, e.g., Associated Press, Arizona Couple Sues Walmart After Being Accused of
Sexual Abuse over Kids' Bath-Time Photos, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 18, 2009,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/arizona-couple-sues-walmart-accused-sexual-
abuse-kids-bath-time-photos-article-1.405737. As Amy Adler demonstrated, the sexual
potential of the young person is already lurking as dangerous in its potential to draw
pedophilic advances, or simply to raise immodest and inappropriate thoughts and fantasies.
See Amy Adler, Child Pornography Law and the Proliferation of the Sexualized Child, in
CENSORING CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO FREE EXPRESSION 228 (Robert Atkins &
Svetlana Mintcheva eds., 2006).
149 The Hippocratic Oath does mention secrecy that the physician owes to patients. See
Hippocratic Oath, WEILL CORNELL MED. C. (2005), available at http://weill.cornell.edu/
deans/pdf/hippocratic-oath.pdf.
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convention is that patients are entitled to a chaperone, private facilities for
undressing, gowns, and other means that reflect respect toward the social
convention that dictates dress and creates a considerate, comfortable, and
dignified atmosphere for the patient. 50 TSA agents, at least at this point, lack
both the professional ethos and the public perception that their gaze is clinical
and impersonal. Moreover, in such contexts we expose our bodies for our own
needs: to promote health or beauty, whereas in the airport, our bodies are
exposed to promote the general good, which only indirectly benefits us
personally.
Is nakedness less politically charged than we might think? One might argue,
against our argument, that the naked body merely reveals one's "pre-cultural"
natural body, a body that by being stripped of clothes, is being momentarily
positioned nearer to our animalistic nature (as opposed to our mental human
capacities such as reasoning and language). Therefore, just as animals do not
cover their bodies, being seen naked should mitigate our sense of shame rather
than heighten it. This stance would stress that nakedness emphasizes that we are
all fragile, organic beings, and that we pretty much have similar body parts-
thus nakedness has an egalitarian and democratizing potential of positioning all
humans on the same terrain, without dress, jewelry, or other insignia that
reinforces hierarchies. 151
Our reply is twofold. First, clothes cover the body and reconstruct it by
either hiding or accentuating its contours, and by adding to bodily appearance
rich significance (aesthetic, ideological, social) through the semiotics of
fashion. Through these functions, clothes serve a central role in the cultural
project of distancing humans from animals, minimizing humans' animalistic
nature to the greatest extent possible. Many of our most basic social practices
and seemingly automatic gestures (e.g., using utensils rather than hands for
eating, or covering our nose and mouth when sneezing) revolve around taming
bodily functions, thus camouflaging humans' close affinity with "raw" natural
functions. From Plato to Descartes, the body has been understood as especially
culpable in its potential to demote man to the status of animal.152 Restraining
the body has been a central part of stressing the preeminence of man above a
beast. Therefore, subjecting passengers to a gaze that exposes our nakedness, as
body scanners do, has a destabilizing potential in stripping off the comforting
150 See Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 8.21-Use of Chaperones During Physical
Exams, AM. MED. Ass'N, available at http://www.ama-assn.org//amalpub/physician-resour
ces/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion82 .page (last visited July 23, 2013).
151 Another potentially equalizing effect of body scanning is enabling generally free
citizens to empathize with those who undergo invasive searches on a regular basis, such as
prisoners or people living in conflict zones, who need to go through security checkpoints in
order to go to work or to school. We thank our student Mickey Zar for making this point in
the Law & IT Colloquium at Tel-Aviv University.
152 For a classic account of the threat body represents in Western culture due to its
affinity with nature, see Susan Bordo, Introduction: Feminism, Western Culture, and the
Body, in UNBEARABLE WEIGHT 1, 1-42 (1993).
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enfolding of culture around our person and demoting us to raw, animalistic,
untamed, and uncivilized creatures.
Second, the naked body is far from being neutral or natural. It carries rich
meaning as it is saturated with cultural signification. Nakedness in sites such as
communal public showers, writes geographer Rob Cover,
is a practice of the Foucauldian confessional-by virtue of the revelation of an
"inner" image of the body devoid of the significations of clothing and
variously encoded otherwise in terms of musculature, genitalia shapes and
sizes, chests and breasts, abilities, skin colouring, tan or sun exposure and so
on. 153
Thus, "it is the site of a disciplined gaze-a gaze that is allegedly without
interest in the sexual."1 54 In the next Section we discuss hierarchical cultural
classifications of bodies. At this point, suffice it to note that there is much that
can be learned and deciphered from one's naked body, thus it should not be
romanticized as a moment of return to innocence.
Back to the airport. When passengers are asked by security agents to step
into the scanner or stand in front of it, legs apart, place their feet in precise
spots, and assume a specific posture of arms raised above one's head but not
straight up, the setting conveys a strong message: they are expected to instantly
doff their deeply ingrained inhibitions about being seen naked.' 55 As
passengers, they are expected to undo the nexus that law and culture make
between the capacity for moral judgment and feeling that there are body parts
that should be hidden from public view. Not only are passengers expected to
suspend what culture tells them about the imperative to cover their bodies, but
they are expected to suspend the messages usually conveyed by criminal and
civil law regarding nudity. For a few seconds they must emotionally become
merely flesh: inanimate matter that needs to be inspected because it might serve
as a vehicle for dangerous weapons. The airport context subjects us to a one-
way gaze, as we are unable to look back at the machine and the remote agents
that watch us. This gaze is particularly disorienting because passengers remain
physically dressed while they are virtually undressed. Since the stripping off is
done with an invisible ray, the sense of loss of control and disorientation might
be heightened.
The covert message that the State conveys, then, is that in those few
seconds of scanning, the body is rendered mere flesh in the eyes of those who
153 See Cover, supra note 131, at 59.
154 Id
155 The process of shedding of items that constitute our appearance (and therefore our
social persona) as civilized and well groomed begins before stepping into the scanner.
Passengers are asked to take off their shoes and remove their belts, jewelry, and head wraps.
Taking off these seemingly small items might literally and symbolically dismantle one's
composed posture and have a destabilizing effect.
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gaze at us, without any social or cultural significance.156 But, as Cover
commented, the naked body is "always already represented and constrained by
codes of behaviour, contexts, differentiation from the clothed body, loose
significations and cultural rituals."1 57 Thus it is not that the State requires
passengers to agree to be naked or to be seen naked; rather, the State places
passengers in a situation in which, whether they like it or not, they do naked-
they perform their nudity as they are being stripped of their clothes by means of
technological imaging.15 8
Agreeing to be seen naked, or to do naked, is decidedly not a benign,
everyday experience for us, and the law is a significant agent in reinforcing our
reluctance to be seen naked.159 Airport body scanning, in sum, confronts
passengers with an unfamiliar and unexpected requirement that they subject
themselves to a stripping gaze. This unexpectedness is a result of the dissonance
between the regular socio-legal requirement to dress and the airport security
requirement to (virtually) undress. As we show in the next Section, another
dissonance that passengers experience during scanning is between being treated
by the State as equal-bodily differences notwithstanding-and being marked
due to bodily traits that are considered abnormal.
B. The Normal/Abnormal Dissonance
[S]urveillance contributes to reinforcing existing power relations rather than
challenging them.160
Our culture constantly classifies bodies along an axis of normality and
abnormality. Messages about the desired and normative bodies on the one hand,
and the bodies that should be corrected, hidden, or considered embarrassing or
156Another interesting avenue to explore in this context is whether there are class
differences between passengers and TSA employees. Middle or upper-middle class
passengers may be accustomed to exposing their bodies only by choice and only to educated
and trained professionals, such as physicians or masseurs. Thus the airport scanning context
may create unease in its exceptionality, at least for this group: stripping is done in front of
agents who earn less and might be less educated than the passengers. We are grateful to
Anita Allen for making this observation in a conversation.
157 Cover, supra note 131, at 53.
158 On performance as a helpful concept for understanding embodied practices, see
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 128-41
(1990).
159 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 8, at 503. Levy proposes a bright line rule for privacy
violations regarding the body: any search that looks within the body would be forbidden
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 533. Similarly, any usage of technological means to
inspect the body beyond the inspector's eyes would be considered harm to privacy. Id. at
536. We concur.
160 Hille Koskela, "Cam Era" the Contemporary Urban Panopticon, 1 SURVEILLANCE
& Soc'Y 292, 301 (2003).
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unappealing on the other hand, are ubiquitous.161 Commercial ads and
magazines' lifestyle columns present ideal images of the bodies to which we
should all aspire.162 The gazes of doctors, sexologists, clerics, teachers, social
workers, physiotherapists,163 gym instructors, employers, and potential intimate
partners classify our bodies as either normal or deformed, deviant, and in need
of correction. As Foucault described:
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the
teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the "social worker"-judge;
it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each
individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures,
his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements.1 64
Our social and physical world is organized in a way that provides numerous
and ongoing reminders to some of us about our bodily inferiority. People using
wheelchairs, for example, often face accessibility barriers to schools,
restaurants, and many other venues. They might also be mistakenly treated as
feebleminded just because they use a wheelchair.165 Fat people cannot find
clothes in regular stores, cannot fit in the airplane seat, and are expected to do
almost anything to lose weight, or at least to cover their body and hide their
excess fat, for it is both shameful and not aesthetic.166 These groups face
161 See generally ABIGAIL C. SAGUY, WHAT'S WRONG WITH FAT? (2013) (critiquing the
moral panic against fat bodies); THE ROUTLEDGE QUEER STUDIES READER (Donald E. Hall &
Annamarie Jagose eds., 2013) (surveying theoretical approaches to bodies sexually
abnormal); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006)
(analyzing the social demands from minorities to convert, pass, or cover, and suggesting a
civil rights framework to protect against such pressures).
162 There is myriad literature on cultural messages regarding normal or ideal bodies. See
generally Daniel Agliata & Stacey Tantleff-Dunn, The Impact of Media Exposure on Males'
Body Image, 23 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 7 (2004); Anne E. Becker, Television,
Disordered Eating, and Young Women in Fii: Negotiating Body Image and Identity During
Rapid Social Change, 28 CULTURE MED. & PSYCHIATRY 533 (2004) (analyzing the
relationship between media images of "ideal" bodies and eating disorders); Shelly Grabe et
al., The Role of the Media in Body Image Concerns Among Women: A Meta-analysis of
Experimental and Correlational Studies, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (2008).
163 See Michal Hoffman, Bodies Completed: On the Physical Rehabilitation of Lower
Limb Amputees, 17 HEALTH 229, 235 (2013) (finding that physiotherapists encourage
patients to pass as able-bodied, sometimes at the expense of functionality and comfort in
movement).
164 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 304 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
165 See Linda McClain et al., A Qualitative Assessment of Wheelchair Users'Experience
with ADA Compliance, Physical Barriers, and Secondary Health Conditions, 6 ToPICS IN
SPINAL CORD INJ. REHABILITATION, Summer 2000, at 99, 112; Paul K. Longmore,
Uncovering the Hidden History of People with Disabilities, 15 REV. AM. HIST. 355, 359
(1987).
166 See Tirosh, supra note 42, at 279-80.
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discrimination in the workplace,167 prejudice and stigma in social encounters
(such as in the dating scene), and to the extent that they are unable to
rehabilitate their bodies and bring them back to "normal," they are expected to
hide their mark of shame. 168
Modem legal principles of liberty and equality, however, entail that the
State disregards such bodily differences. Everyone is equal before the law,
bodily traits notwithstanding. In fact, this equalization of bodies can be
described as the most significant achievement of the main revolutions and of
Enlightenment ideas.169 Historically, achieving equality before the law has
meant, to a great extent, that bodily differences would ideally not matter for the
State-that they would be erased from its visual frame. 170 Thus, in
contemporary liberal regimes one's race, sex, gender, sexual orientation,
birthplace, age, or physical (dis)ability do not determine one's legal status
(except when taking note of one's physical traits serves to achieve substantive
equality, as in the case of affirmative action, or when the State allocates
disability benefits by social insurance).171
Under the gaze of body scanners, the governmental indifference to our
bodily difference dissipates. Airport body scanning creates an event in which
one's bodily abnormality becomes salient in two ways. First, some bodies are
unfit for scanning and need to undergo a thorough physical search. This is the
case, for example, for passengers with prostheses, diapers, or urinal bags. Being
unfit for the mainstream technology re-marks those bodies as deviant and
inferior. Second, for passengers whose bodies are culturally classified as
abnormal, the sense that their unclothed body is gazed at by a government-
authorized agent might amplify their internalized everyday feeling of bodily
inferiority.172 As most of us know from our own experience, wearing clothes
16 7 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE
AND LAW 23-44 (2010) (surveying forms of appearance-based discrimination in different
social contexts).
168 See Karen Throsby, Happy Re-birthday: Weight Loss Surgery and the "New Me," 14
BODY & Soc'Y, Mar. 2008, at 117, 127 (finding that people undergoing weight loss surgery
often hide this fact and pretend to have lost weight through dieting).
16 9 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 156-57 (2011).
170 See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 53 (1997) (arguing against the
disincamate political theory of the orthodox social contract, in which "the body vanishes,
becomes theoretically unimportant"); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 222-23
(1988) (criticizing the false perception that social contract theories promise equality to
everybody, with no significance to bodily difference); KAREN SANCHEz-EPPLER, TOUCHING
LIBERTY: ABOLITION, FEMINISM, AND THE POLITICS OF THE BODY 1-8 (1993) (discussing the
tension between the American constitutional rhetoric by which legal subjects are of equally
disembodied personhood, and the actual unequal application of civil rights to those whose
bodies were defined inferior, such as women and slaves).
171 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (2006); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213.
172 Jouralist Jeffrey Goldberg reported that in a conversation with a TSA agent, the
latter repeatedly referred to the Backscatter scanner as "The Dick-Measuring Device." See
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manages to somewhat mitigate our sense of bodily abnormality (e.g., dressing
in a way that hides our extra pounds, covers scars, or camouflages other
impairments). Subjecting ourselves to a gaze that exposes our body underneath
our clothes might therefore be a moment of emotional distress due to our sense
that we are stripped of the semiotic shields that we put on in order to be able to
walk around in the social world without feeling that our bodily deficiencies are
exposed for all to see. In the paragraphs that follow, we elaborate on these two
forms of harm to privacy.
Not every body (we deliberately do not use "everybody") can go through
airport scanners. Some bodies are unfit for scanning. The scanners' design
reflects the designers' reliance on a notion of prototypically "normal" bodies.173
The scanners cannot detect metal or other materials as such. Rather, they help
detect "anomalies." 74 Thus, they are designed for a body of a person that can
stand up and raise his or her arms; a body to which no prostheses are attached. It
is a body in which bladder and colon are within one's control, thus it is in no
need of diapers. Any body that deviates from these characteristics is unfit for
scanning. Individuals whose bodies challenge the existing scanning technology
are required to subject themselves to a thorough manual examination, which
involves the TSA agent touching their skin surface, including intimate parts
such as the inside of their thighs and their buttocks. Passengers report even
more intimate touching. 175
Jeffrey Goldberg, For the First Time, the TSA Meets Resistance, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/1 0/for-the-first-time-the-tsa-meets-resista
nce/65390/.
173 Other visual inspection technologies in which the State gazes at its subjects have
similar exclusionary effects. See, e.g., Koskela, supra note 160, at 298 (discussing
surveillance in urban spaces as a means to exclude "the Other"); id at 300-01 (surveillance
technology reflects fears about populations regarded as different, monitoring groups whose
visual appearance is interpreted as deviant).
174 TSA Oversight Part I: Whole Body Imaging: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'1
Sec., Homeland Def & Foreign Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
112th Cong. 73-74 (2011) (statement of Fred H. Cate, Director, Center for Applied
Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University).
175 The ACLU received complaints from passengers who felt that the searches were
invasive, punitive, and humiliating. A substantial number of the complaints came from
people with medical conditions. For specific stories, see Passengers' Stories of Recent
Travel, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/passengers-stories-recent-travell (last visited Oct. 26,
2013). Other reported incidents include a passenger groping a TSA agent, arguing this was a
way to protest her own sense of being groped. Meena Hart Duerson, Carol Jean Price
Accused of Groping TSA Agent, Florida Woman Says Just Demonstrating the Treatment She
Received, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 19, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/
carol-jean-price-accused-groping-tsa-agent-florida-woman-demonstrating-treatment-receiv
ed-article-1.1098521; see also Lauri Apple, Woman Arrested for Grabbing TSA Agent's
Boobs, GAWKER (July 16, 2011), http://gawker.com/5821894/woman-arrested-for-grabbing-
tsa-agents-boob). A female passenger's shirt was pulled off during a pat-down, exposing her
breasts. See Kevin Underhill, TSA Settles with Woman Whose Top Was Pulled Down,
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Thus, when the scanning machine does not produce a green light, it
indicates that it cannot produce a reliable image of a specific body. At that
moment, the passenger is labeled as abnormal, experiencing again what social
norms about bodily normality already remind him or her on a daily basis. The
very requirement that they step outside of the scanner and be searched
differently marks such individuals as deviant in the eyes of others (TSA agents
and fellow-passengers alike), and themselves.
But this badge of exceptionality that is produced by being labeled unfit for
the routinized scanning is not the only damage caused. Many people-perhaps
most people-have some sense of inferiority and abnormality regarding some
aspect of their body that they manage to conceal (at least partly) with clothes or
other accessories, such as a wig, but which is then exposed by the scanner.
People cover scars, for example, for they may mark diseases, surgeries, or
accidents. People who are considered overweight certainly carry such sense of
shame and often also responsibility for their extra pounds, trying to conceal
their folds and curves through clothes.176 Women tend to feel less at ease with
their appearance and are more prone to feel vulnerable under inspecting
gazes.177 The image produced by scanners exposes the exact contours of their
body. People with genitalia that do not fit their outward gender appearance (say,
preoperative transgender individuals or intersex people) may feel similarly
harshly exposed. Phrased in the terms suggested above, these passengers may
experience the normal/abnormal dissonance when undergoing body scanning.
Normally, their legal persona is as individuals who are equal before the law and
the State without regard to their specific bodily traits. Suddenly, in front of the
airport scanner, their bodies are virtually stripped naked and gazed at, thereby
exposing the traits that they wish to conceal and that are not supposed to enter
the State's sight.
This problem is particularly bothersome for members of groups that
(Western) culture classifies through their bodies, as beings whose bodies play a
more significant (and even determinative) role in defining their "nature."
Women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and people with disabilities are
some such groups.178 The cultural classification of minority identities as ones
with heightened bodily existence usually infiltrates to the psyche of minority
FORBES (June 8, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinunderhill/2011/06/08/
tsa-settles-with-woman-whose-top-was-pulled-down/.
176 On the internalized stigma and guilt of fat people, see Tirosh, supra note 42, at 272.
17 7 Feminist psychologist Susie Orbach observed that femininity today means hating
your body. See Aida Edemariam, The Saturday Interview: Susie Orbach, GUARDIAN, Feb.
25, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2011/feb/26/susie-orbach-endangered-
species-summit. This is probably increasingly true for men as well. See generally SUSAN
BORDO, THE MALE BODY: A NEW LOOK AT MEN IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE (2000)
(discussing the emergence of the male body as an object of critical cultural gaze).
17 8 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW 107-23 (2007) (women, gays, Jews, and other groups were constructed as having
essential body inferiority, and thus as unworthy of equality).
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group members and becomes part of their internalized experience of
themselves.179 Often, people with bodies that are culturally marked as abnormal
experience their body as more central to their identity and to how they perceive
themselves compared to members of unmarked groups (such as males, whites,
straights, etc.). That is, their identity is entangled with their body in more
intense, rich, and meaningful ways than those with unmarked bodies.
Political philosopher Iris Marion Young demonstrates this point by
discussing the embodied experience of women. She begins with Maurice
Merleau Ponty's observation that for bodies to move in the world, to move
towards other objects, they have to transcend their own object-ness and refer to
themselves as subjects. "As subject, the body refers not onto itself, but onto the
world's possibilities." 80 But for feminine existence, Young observes, "the body
is frequently both subject and object for itself at the same time and in reference
to the same act. Feminine bodily existence is frequently not a pure presence to
the world because it is referred onto itself as well as onto possibilities in the
world."' 8 ' In other words, it is very hard for many women to simply be in their
bodies and act through them. This, according to Young, cannot be explained
through physical or psychological theories, but is rather a product of living in
social conditions of sexism. 182 Because society objectifies women, their
existence is "physically inhibited, confined, positioned, and objectified."l 83 This
experience of self-reference leads women to insecurity regarding whether their
motions are entirely under their control. If women's social existence is, as
Young argues, an existence as object of the gaze of another, then they are more
severely impacted when they are put in a situation in which their bodies are
being gazed upon, as happens in airport scanners. 184
A parallel argument can be made for people with disabilities,185 people of
color,186 transgender people, or fat people. Members of these groups have an
179 See, e.g., FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 109 (Charles Lam Markmann
trans., 1967 ) (awareness of one's race, and of racism, is a product of the gaze of others).
180 Iris Marion Young, Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body
Comportment Motility and Spatiality, 3 HUM. STUD. 137, 148 (1980).
181 Id. (citation omitted).
182 See id. at 152.
183 Id
184 Koskela argued that the gendered nature of surveillance technology must be
recognized, and that "the female body is still an object of a gaze in different way [sic] than
the male body." Koskela, supra note 160, at 301. Following Dora Epstein, Abject Terror: A
Story of Fear, Sex, and Architecture, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR 133, 138 (Nan Ellin ed.,
1997), Koskela expressed concern that spaces covered by surveillance cameras will be
avoided by women due to their heightened awareness of the effects of the gaze. Koskela,
supra note 160, at 301.
185 Anita L. Allen, Face to Face with "It": And Other Neglected Contexts of Health
Privacy, 151 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'Y 300, 305, 308 (2007) (because some ill people
experience increased feelings of vulnerability, respecting privacy in this context enables
minimizing their emotional distress).
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intensified experience of their corporeality, and have more exposed
psychological membranes to having their bodies subjected to inspection.
Thus, body scanning technology has a disparate impact on those whose
bodies are socially classified as normal and those who are considered abnormal.
Bodily privacy could have equalized the diversity of bodies and reinstalled the
State's required indifference to such differences. However, the scanners
frustrate these reasonable expectations and this equalizing potential. The
burden, and hence the privacy violation, on people whose bodies are tagged
abnormal is greater than on the former.' 8 7 In other words, when it comes to the
stigmatized groups we mentioned here, the right to privacy is allocated
unequally. This is quite paradoxical, as body scanning has been presented as an
equalizing technology, which successfully replaces human profiling. 88
C. Privacy and Shame
The discussion thus far has suggested that when passengers are scanned, the
governmental gaze at the naked body contradicts its routine messages, about the
social norms of dressing, and about the irrelevance of bodily differences. How
does this conclusion fit within privacy theory? This section ties the two
dissonances to privacy scholarship, and then presents-and responds-to a
possible critique.
1. Privacy?
Most scholars, and as we saw above, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, too,
have assumed that body scanners harm privacy, but have not articulated the
harm. The close reading of the court's opinion revealed that the assumed harm
is related to the production of the image: when the TSA agent sees what she
sees, and whether the State maintains a database of the images (it does not). The
production of the image and its storage could indeed have a harmful potential,
as the agent may have associated an image with a person, and may reveal
intimate personal data. A database, if there were one, would be extremely
sensitive, and the potential harm would obviously be staggering. Many of these
concerns can be diffused by the technological design (blurring faces, using
generic figures, not storing the images even momentarily), and by
administrative means (locating the agents so they cannot see the passengers).
186 See FANON, supra note 179, at 109; Koskela, supra note 160, at 301 (pointing to the
more severe impact of surveillance technologies on black people).187 Privacy in general is not equally distributed. A research project that examined the
privacy implications of future technologies observed this phenomenon and called it privacy
divides. See Michael Birnhack & Niv Ahituv, Deliverable D6.2, Analysis of the Legal
Implications of Emerging & Future Technologies, PRACTIS 36 (July 23, 2012),
http://practis.org/docs/D62%2OPolicy%/2Olmplications%20FINAL.pdf
188 We are grateful to our student, Alon Jasper, for this observation at the Law & IT
Colloquium at Tel-Aviv University.
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But the discussion of the two dissonances indicates that there is more at stake. It
is not only the outcome of the search that raises concerns; it is the search itself.
One way to phrase the privacy harm is to locate the dissonances within
Fourth Amendment doctrine, and specifically, the reasonable expectations
test. 189 There is ample critique of this test as both tautological and too
malleable, and for its shortcomings in handling new technologies,190 but for the
time being we accept it, as it governs privacy doctrine. The two dissonances we
presented above mean that our old expectations about the privacy of our bodies
(dress/undress) and about its social and self-acceptability (normal/abnormal) are
reasonable. The reasonableness is established and constantly reinforced through
social and legal norms.
The two dissonances further establish that current expectations as to bodily
privacy are unlikely to change any time soon. This is an important point, as in
other contexts, it seems that the Supreme Court portrayed the reasonableness
element of the test as a descriptive matter rather than a normative position.
Thus, according to this construction of the test, if a certain practice seems at one
point reasonable (having privacy), but circumstances change so that it is no
longer experienced as the common situation-the judicial conclusion might
change. An example is the case of privacy in the workplace. In a 1987 case, the
Court ruled that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk drawers. But the Court offered employers an escape route: "Public
employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation."l91
To the extent that the test is based on a descriptive element, passengers
might get used to not having bodily privacy in the specific airport context, but
this will not be a result of changing expectations about bodily privacy in
general, but only-if it so turns out-as to the specific situation. In fact, the
TSA's announcement about eliminating the naked backscatter scanners
reinforces current privacy expectations. If the government will again change its
mind, and attempt to reintroduce the backscatters, such a hypothetical move is
likely to meet much stronger privacy sentiments. If, however, reasonableness is
best understood as containing a normative element, i.e., a value judgment of the
expectations, then we need an external yardstick, according to which we can
evaluate passengers' expectations.
This is where we depart from Nissenbaum's framework of contextual
integrity.192 Up to this point, we have examined the airport situation before and
189 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
190See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 71-74 (2008); Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth
Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 303, 325 (2010) ("'Reasonableness' is not an independent
inquiry. To conclude that a search is 'reasonable,' courts must make prior judgments about
the importance of a particular police practice or a particular privacy interest.").
191 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
192 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 11, at 129.
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after the sociotechnological system was installed and evaluated the change in
terms of the informational norms. To the extent that the scanners have an
impact on the flow of information, it is obvious that there is a dramatic change,
in that information about one's body that was considered private is now
available to TSA agents. However, as one of us argued elsewhere, contextual
integrity brings us only this far. It does not contain in itself a much needed
normative element that can serve as a measure, to evaluate whether the change
in the flow of information is good or bad.193 This is where privacy theories
enter the picture.
There are several main theories of privacy, or more accurately, of the legal
right to privacy. This is not the place to discuss these theories.194 For the current
purposes, we maintain that a group of different justifications share a common
core, which is that privacy is best understood as a matter of control: control of
oneself.1 95 The justifications turn to a philosophical understanding of the human
condition, in the spirit of Kant; to psychological needs of developing one's
personality and identity, along with the social need not to be taken out of one's
own context. The justifications do not stop at the boundaries of the individual,
but look also at the importance of privacy for maintaining intimate
relationships,196 certain professional relationships, and even the community at
large. 197 The different theories all converge at one point: the individual person
is the one to make decisions about his own fate, about his own information.
Privacy as control, thus, is not a justification in itself It is a heading that
groups together different justifications. Privacy as control is often caricaturized
as relying too much on notice and consent, and hence it is a short way to portray
privacy as control as the commodification of privacy. If thinking about privacy
in terms of property is correct, then the conceptualization of privacy as control
facilitates even more harm to our privacy.198 However, privacy as control does
not need to be conceptualized as property. It derives from Kantian notions of
human dignity and autonomy. Privacy law has developed its own set of tools,
referred to as Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs).199
Framing the airport body scanning situation within this understanding of
privacy, as a matter of one's control over oneself without external interference,
193 See Birnhack, supra note 12, at 449.
194 For a thorough discussion, see generally SOLOVE, supra note 190. Solove, however,
finds flaws with each theory, and hence opts for a sociological, descriptive taxonomy. In this
aspect, Nissenbaum's and Solove's approaches are similar, as they turn to a sociological
description, rather than a normative analysis.
195 The first and most powerful articulation of privacy as control is ALAN F. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 169-326 (1967).
196 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 490 (1968).
19 7 See EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 123-86 (1978).
198 For an argument along this line, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives:
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
199 FIPPs emerged through a series of national reports in the 1970s, and were then
legislated by international instruments in the 1980s. Their current most influential
articulation is found in the EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 121.
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draws our attention not only to the outcome of the search, but to the initial
point, when we stand in front of the machine. At that moment, the passenger has
little choice (to fly or not to fly, to be scanned or physically touched). The
passenger is exposed, without knowing who sees what, without access to such
data, and in a state of unsettled confusion about the contradictory messages that
the State signals about the importance of being dressed and the irrelevance of
bodily traits, while undressing and marking the passenger. At that point, the
passenger loses control over herself. Importantly, the fact that the inspection
takes place in public does not eliminate the privacy interest.200 If the passenger
were to see her scanned image, it might ease some of the tension because it
would return some control over the gaze to the passenger, but at the same time,
the dissonances might only be enhanced.
2. Shame?
A significant objection to our argument would be that by legitimizing
people's sense of awkwardness and shame about their bodies and by suggesting
that airport security technology should be designed in a way that does not single
out those with abnormal bodies, we contribute to deepening the social stigma
attached to such bodies. Wouldn't it be better, the objection would go, if our
socio-legal arrangement celebrated the body and bodily diversity rather than
downplaying and hiding it? After all, by legally validating one's sense of bodily
inferiority, and respecting one's need to pass as normal-bodied, we reify the
value-laden hierarchy between bodies rather than mitigate it.
This critique echoes familiar criticism of privacy, that it protects secrets that
someone wishes to hide, namely, secrets which society would be better off if
they were not secret. The popular critique points to criminals or people who
should be, socially speaking, ashamed of what they have done.201 The common
response is that we all have secrets that we wish not to share, or at least we
would like to make the decision as to what we share, with whom and how, on
our own. But the critique against our argument, portrayed in its best light, is
even stronger. Namely, that we require privacy not for what people do, but for
who they are, with the result of reinforcing social stigma. Examples include the
outing of another person's sexual preferences against his will or illnesses that
carry social stigma. If privacy assists in concealing these facts, so the argument
goes, we might reinstate the closet instead of shattering it,202 and we might
reinstate stigma instead of dispelling it.
200 See Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559 (1998) (discussing collection of data which is
publicly available).
201 For a decisive reply, see Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing To Hide" and Other
Misunderstandings ofPrivacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 745, 764 (2007).
2 0 2 See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 67 (1990). Although
Sedgwick does not discuss privacy directly, her discussion of the social construction of the
closet fits the argument above.
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A similar argument is made in the surveillance context. David Bell argues,
for example, that body diversity would be promoted if people who are
considered deviant stop trying to hide their body from the technological gaze.203
In a similar vein, criticizing the repeated invocation of the toilet example in
discussion of transsexuals' rights, 204 Tobias Wolff argues that invoking a sense
of shame and bodily anxiety due to bodily differences has served as a rhetorical
weapon by those objecting to granting civil rights to discriminated groups such
as blacks, gays, or transgender people.205 How much weight should be ascribed
to the agitation of "natural" women who may need to share the public bathroom
with male-to-female transsexuals? Ascribing great significance to such privacy
concerns reifies and legitimizes taboos around nudity, norms of female chastity,
and social conventions that connect feminine practices to concealment (for
example, the usage of euphemism, such as going to powder one's nose to refer
to many other bodily practices that are better left untold).
Jeffrey Weeks recognizes the paradox regarding privacy that takes place
when one claims that he or she is entitled to legal recognition and
accommodation of his or her bodily difference. Such claimants "go public," in
order to protect the possibility of private life and private choice. 206 This
recognition of the complexity of the movement between public and private is
critical.
Our topic-body scanners-raises the challenge of how to find a way to
both insist that one's body should be treated with equal respect no matter how
far it is from entrenched notions of normality, and at the same time, insist that
one's sense of awkwardness in exposing that body is worthy of recognition and
legal protection.
203 David Bell, Surveillance Is Sexy, 6 SURVEILLANCE & Soc'Y 203, 211 (2009).
204 This example invokes the case of male-to-female transsexual persons using the
women's toilets. Such diffusion of sex segregation rules might, so the argument goes, expose
"real" women to harassment and to violation of their privacy.
205 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REv. 201, 231 (2012); see also id. at 202 ("The body can be a site of vulnerability and pain,
shame and pleasure, excitement and embarrassment-human experiences that are often
unmediated by rational thought and impervious to reasoned argument. When opponents of
civil rights reform mobilize these primal forces in response to progressive efforts, they wield
a potent tool for preserving existing arrangements of status and power.").
206 Jeffrey Weeks, The Sexual Citizen, 15 THEORY CULTURE & Soc'Y, Aug. 1998, at 35,
37. Weeks acknowledges that subjectivities and identities "may be fictions, but they are
necessary fictions: they provide the means through which we negotiate the hazards of
everyday life in a world in a process of constant change." Id. at 46 (citation omitted). Rob
Cover points to this tension as well:
Where nakedness upsets the performance of subjecthood is in the paradox between the
sheer commonality of nakedness, since we all have a body that does naked, and the
signification of nakedness as something very, very personal and private (with private
parts); hence the strictures of contexts which code and constrain the ways in which
naked is performed under the gaze of others.
See Cover, supra note 131, at 58.
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This is, indeed, a complex challenge. We maintain that legal arrangements
can rise to this challenge and produce rules that recognize and accommodate the
negative feelings people with bodies that are considered inferior might feel
when they are being gazed at, and at the same time do not reproduce an account
of their inferiority. After all, this is what antidiscrimination laws have been
doing for many decades: marking the protected group, but not in order to
emphasize its difference, but rather in order to mitigate the social disadvantages
attached to it.
Importantly, similar dilemmas come up in many other legal contexts, and in
none of them is there an easy or clear-cut solution. For example,
antidiscrimination and affirmative action laws typically name the groups and
identify categories that they wish to protect (e.g., race, sex, gender, sexual
orientation, or people of color). Thereby, to some extent, these laws unwittingly
subvert their own purpose, which is to render such identity classifications
insignificant and stress the extent to which they are a matter of social
construction rather than of essential differences. To employ poststructuralist
jargon, by interpolating a legal subject as a woman or a gay person, the law
does not merely reflect her identity, but takes part in bringing it about.207
Defamation cases raise another analogous problem. When courts grant
compensation to a plaintiff who argues that he was defamed because a
publication falsely referred to him as gay, as fat, or as black, they reaffirm the
stigma attached to these identities.208
All of these dilemmas call for a careful and nuanced navigation between is
and ought; between existing social conditions and ideal ones. Going back to our
first analogy, of whether antidiscrimination laws reify social differences by
naming different groups, we believe that historical experience demonstrates that
it was imperative that antidiscrimination laws delineate specific groups, because
this enabled noticing the particular ways in which members of these groups are
afflicted by negative stereotypes and bias.209 Similarly, in the case of whether to
accommodate sex change, we think that in a culture in which binary and stable
sex identities prevail, it would be patronizingly cruel to ask transgender people
to occupy fluid and undefined gender identities and suffer the social harms that
207 See JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 107
(1997).
208 On imputations of homosexuality in defamation case law, see Eric K.M. Yatar,
Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: Re-thinking
Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 LAw & SEXUALITY 119, 129-32 (2003).
209 See Noya Rimalt, Israeli Feminism Whence and Whither: Rethinking Diference,
Dignity, and Gender Based Equality Following Feminism, Rights and the Law by Orit
Kamir, 27 TEL-Aviv U. L. REV. 857 (2004) (arguing that explicitly naming categories such
as sex has value for enhancing equality); cf Orit Kamir, Why (Equality ofi Human Dignity Is
Favorable over Equality of Liberty: The Social Meaning of the Israeli Choice of Human
Dignity as a Basic Value, 13 HAMISHPAT (2009) (arguing that dignity has an advantage over
equality because it rids legal discourse of the need to rely on socially reified categories);
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 837 (1990) (urging
readers to "ask the woman question" when analyzing any legal issue).
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such identities attract. In other words, the much needed social change cannot be
imposed onto unwilling individuals. Those who are willing to challenge the
social norms, should, of course, be able to do so, and be admired for their
courage and vision.
The same applies in the airport context. In a culture obsessed with
classifying and ranking bodies, it is unjust to lay the burden of challenging the
social norms on those who suffer from them most. To say that the fat or the
disabled person should not feel harmed by the way that the scanner's
technology is designed because recognizing this harm would reify hierarchies
between bodies is to disregard legal subjects' autonomy, and disqualify their
sense of what kind of protection they need from the law. Admittedly, this is a
liberal position, situated within a legal rights discourse. The answer
distinguishes between the long run social goal, which we share, of shattering the
closet, stigma, and shame of our bodies. But in the short run, the way to
challenge these strongly-held social conventions is not by ignoring those of
us-perhaps all of us-who are already caught within these conventions. We
would love to see the day when shame in one's body is gone, but until we reach
that point, society, and especially the State, should not impose the heavy burden
on those who cannot carry it all by themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
The story of body scanners is an ongoing one: social concerns (anti-terror
measures) resulted in the development and use of new surveillance
technologies, which then met with social protests and legal challenges on the
public's side, and some technological and organizational adjustments on the
government's side, alongside a defacto practice of growing acceptance, only to
be overturned again by a new policy decision, to withdraw some kinds of
machines from airports. At this point in time, there is a continuous search for
less invasive technologies. An important technological development might be,
for example, that scanners will be able to automatically detect the kind of
external object carried on the body, thus separating the diaper from the bomb, or
the prosthesis from the gun. Accordingly, the social construction of scanners is
yet to be settled.
The details tell the story of our everyday lives in a post-9/ 11 technological
age. There is also a broader story here. The case of body scanners demonstrates
the interplay between technology and the law, in this case, privacy law. The
popular and legal discourses often treat surveillance technologies as if they were
predetermined, neutral, and fixed. This uncritical approach, along with the fact
that technologies often aim to serve important purposes such as national
security, might lead to their almost automatic legitimization. One such
indication for the prompt legitimization of invasive technologies is the general
cooperation of passengers with airport scanning. The fact that most passengers
support body scanning and have not felt that this practice violated their privacy
in unbearable or excessive ways is fascinating in itself, and merits more
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theorizing about the effects of search practices on our perception of privacy. As
the case of body scanners exemplifies, technological design is much more
malleable than is usually assumed and can be designed with more or with less
mindfulness to privacy considerations. The realization that privacy concerns can
be accommodated opens up the possibility to assess a given technology's harm
to privacy without being intellectually paralyzed due to a false sense of awe in
light of a new technology and to the security interests at stake.
The prevalent legal analysis balances the competing considerations of
privacy and national security without providing an account of why and how
exactly scanning harms privacy. 210 Judicial balancing under such conceptually
deficient conditions is partial and unsatisfying. Our account of the two
dissonances that passengers experience when they are ordered to stand
dressed-but naked-in front of the machine, subject to the gaze of the scanner
operators, explains the ways in which privacy is compromised by this
technology. While the State usually reinforces anti-nudity conventions,
passengers undergoing scanning are expected to instantly shed any qualms
about their naked bodies (the dress/undress dissonance). Furthermore, whereas
in most other contexts the governmental gaze is principally indifferent to body
diversity and to cultural hierarchies between different bodies, scanning
technology amplifies bodily differences and their different cultural value (the
normal/abnormal dissonance).
Framing these dissonances into the reasonable expectations test produces a
troubling conclusion. Namely, that passengers can (and probably do) reasonably
expect not to be subject to a technology that virtually strips them of their clothes
and-at least in the case of backscatters-produces an image of their naked
bodies. It is not only the fact that scanning produces an image of passengers'
unclothed bodies that is problematic: passengers' lack of control of their own
bodies and of the information gathered about them is what defies their
reasonable expectations and harms privacy. But the reasonableness of human
expectations is subject to rapid changes. As in the case of other new
technologies, the public has not yet formed expectations about the privacy
implications of body scanners. Thus, the social framing of the debate at this
point in time is crucial.
210 There are many more privacy issues at stake, which we leave for another day. For
example, should Congress intervene and regulate body scanners or should courts, operating
under general Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, undertake the mission? For this observation
of the division of labor (not in the context of body scanners), see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REv. 801, 857-88 (2004).
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